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Abstract
The fallout from the financial crisis continues to inform the development
of corporate and securities law, and the new regulatory landscape for economic activity within the United States is beginning to take form. This evolutionary process, however, has been anything but stable or certain. As might
be expected, in concert with such momentous change in law and policy, recriminations for and associated investigations of past activity continue to
affect competent regulators as well as market participants. Nevertheless,
while many of the underlying causes of the financial crisis are now better
understood by both policy makers and scholars, the question remains – given
where we were, where do we go from here? While a definitive answer to such
a question remains elusive, an additional perspective on the ethical issues of
relevance to corporate and securities law may be helpful in considering the
possible alternatives. In particular, the ethical rules of corporate gatekeepers in conflicts of interest scenarios are worthy of further consideration and
discussion.
This article presents the argument that cases involving conflicts of interest in the corporate and securities law space may be viewed as primarily
calling into question the ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper. In support
of such an argument, this article sets forth a framework for conflicts of interest scenarios that takes into account four categories of legal rules – activity
rules, disclosure rules, liability rules and ethical rules. In adopting such a
framework, this article will elaborate on an ethical perspective will be elaborated to address the ongoing development of corporate and securities law.
Further, this article proposes further analysis in relation to disclosure rules
on conflicts of interest policies for Compensation Committees as mandated by
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Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.
This article is the second in a series that explores the intersection of
corporate law and legal ethics.1 Specifically, the present discussion concerns
the foundations in doctrine and theory that may apply to issues of conflicts of
interest within the ambit of corporate and securities law. Accordingly, the
subject matter for discussion includes both rules of the professions – or firstorder ethical rules – and rules as may be prescribed by the competent authority – that is, second-order ethical rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.
If you think about that, you’ll do things differently.
– Warren Buffett2

1. See, e.g., Christopher T. Hines, Returning to First Principles of Privilege
Law: Focusing on the Facts in Internal Corporate Investigations, 60 U. KAN. L. REV.
33 (2011).
2. Editorial, In Buffett We Trust, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/3a44e3c2-5eea-11e0-a2d7-00144feab49a,s01=1.html#axzz1UTO1n76O
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“Reputation is a fleeting thing.”3 In the world of high finance, a master
of the universe today can quickly become tomorrow’s cautionary tale.4 It is,
therefore, unsurprising to find that in the aftermath of the financial crisis5 the
professional reputations of numerous market actors and policy makers have
experienced this very reversal of fortune.6 In many cases one may credibly
(“Whatever the strict legal status of the share purchases Mr. Buffett’s now-departed
colleague, David Sokol, made in Lubrizol, they look impossible to justify from an
ethical standpoint.”). As recounted in the report of the Audit Committee of Berkshire
Hathaway to its Board of Directors, David Sokol, former Chairman of several Berkshire subsidiaries, engaged in certain purchases of shares of The Lubrizol Corporation
prior to its acquisition by Berkshire in an all-cash transaction. Memorandum from the
Audit Committee, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. to the Board of Directors, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., Trading in Lubrizol Corporation Shares by David L. Sokol, (Apr. 26,
2011), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news /APR2711.pdf. As a
result of such revelations, Mr. Sokol resigned from Berkshire Hathaway. See News
Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Warren E. Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway,
Announces the Resignation of David L. Sokol (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.berk shirehathaway.com/news/MAR3011.pdf.
3. Although reputation itself may have an evanescent quality, it would appear
that practitioners of law have long understood this momentary aspect of one’s professional reputation. See, e.g., Hon. William A. Sutherland, The Facts in the Case, Lecture to Law Students of Rochester, New York (1895), in 3 AM. LAW. 544, 545 (1895)
(“Reputation is a fleeting thing. There is not one here tonight who can name twenty
lawyers prominent fifty years ago. We pass into forgetfulness as the farmer and the
merchant and the hackdriver, and when we appear before another tribunal from which
there is no appeal it will be better for us to have done our duty by our clients than
have sought a little cheap glory for ourselves.”).
4. See, e.g., TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987) (telling the
fictional tale of the downfall of Sherman McCoy, Wall Street hotshot and selfproclaimed “Master of the Universe”). Although many in the United States still suffer from the resulting effects of the financial crisis, the national mood has yet to reach
that which existed in Florence on February 7, 1497. See, e.g., DAVID HACKETT
FISCHER, THE GREAT WAVE: PRICE REVOLUTIONS AND THE RHYTHM OF HISTORY 6768 (1996) (describing the so-called “burning of the vanities,” during which crowds of
Florentines burned paintings, books, and other symbols of luxury in an attempt to
seek atonement for their sins). Unlike the historical Florentines, we have yet to burn
away the purported occasions of sin – that is, our credit cards, overpriced homes and
various personal effects purchased in the age of easy credit. See, e.g., Consumer
Credit, FED. RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, (Aug. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/g19/20110805/g19.htm (“Consumer credit
increased at an annual rate of 4-1/4 percent in the second quarter. In June, consumer
credit increased at an annual rate of 7-3/4 percent, with revolving credit increasing at
a rate of 8 percent and nonrevolving credit increasing at a rate of 7-1/2 percent.”).
5. For purposes of this Article, I continue to adopt the commonly used phrase of
“financial crisis” to refer to the late 2000s global financial crisis. See, e.g., Hines,
supra note 1, at 37 n.20.
6. See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF
HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM –
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argue that such criticisms may be unfounded or excessive,7 nevertheless, the
fact remains that financial disaster has its consequences.8 One of these consequences is that the reputation of those persons in positions of economic
influence and authority will, by necessity, suffer.9
The fallout from the financial crisis continues to inform the development
of corporate and securities law, and the new regulatory landscape for economic activity within the United States is beginning to take form.10 This
evolutionary process, however, has been anything but stable or certain.11 As
might be expected, in concert with such momentous change in law and policy, recriminations for and associated investigations of past activity continue
to affect competent regulators as well as market participants.12 Nevertheless,
AND THEMSELVES 85 (2009) (“By the summer of 2007, however, America’s second
Gilded Age had come shockingly to an end, and [former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan] Greenspan’s reputation lay in tatters.”).
7. See, e.g., Bill George, Why Leaders Lose Their Way, HBR BLOG NETWORK
(June 8, 2011) http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/06/why-leaders-lose-theirway.html (“It’s lonely at the top, because leaders know they are ultimately responsible for the lives and fortunes of people. If they fail, many get deeply hurt. They often
deny the burdens and loneliness, becoming incapable of facing reality. They shut
down their inner voice, because it is too painful to confront or even acknowledge; it
may, however, appear in their dreams as they try to resolve conflicts rustling around
inside their heads.”).
8. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2011) (“The economic
impact of the crisis has been devastating. And the human devastation is continuing.
The officially reported unemployment rate hovered at almost 10% in November 2010,
but the underemployment rate, which includes those who have given up looking for
work and part-time workers who would prefer to be working full-time, was above
17%. And the share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for more
than six months was just above 40%.”).
9. See, e.g., Bush’s Final Approval Rating: 22 Percent, CBSNEWS, Feb. 11,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/16/opinion/polls/main4728399.shtml
(“President Bush will leave office as one of the most unpopular departing presidents
in history, according to a new CBS News/New York Times poll showing Mr. Bush’s
final approval rating at 22 percent.”).
10. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
11. See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Doing the Right Thing, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 691,
694 (1992) [hereinafter Hazard, Doing the Right Thing]; Hines, supra note 1, at 59
n.123.
12. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose
from the Financial Crisis, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last updated Jan. 9, 2013) (reporting key statistics
through January 9, 2013 on seventy entities and individuals charged, and $1.65 billion
in total penalties, disgorgement, and other monetary relief).
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while many of the underlying causes of the financial crisis are now better
understood by both policy makers and scholars, the question remains – given
where we were, where do we go from here?
While a definitive answer to such a question remains elusive, an additional perspective on the ethical issues related to corporate and securities law
may be helpful in considering the possible alternative answers to the question
posed.13 In particular, the ethical rules of corporate gatekeepers14 in conflicts
of interest scenarios are worthy of further consideration and discussion.15
This Article presents the argument that cases involving conflicts of interest in

13. This Article is the second in a series that explores the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics. See Hines, supra note 1. Specifically, the present discussion concerns the foundations in doctrine and theory that may apply to issues of conflicts of interest within the ambit of corporate and securities law. Accordingly, the
subject matter for discussion includes both rules of the professions – or first-order
ethical rules – and rules as may be prescribed by the competent authority – that is,
second-order ethical rules. See infra Part II.D.
14. In concert with the ongoing scholarship of corporate gatekeepers, this Article
will adopt the definition of the corporate gatekeeper as enunciated by Professor John
Coffee. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (“[T]he gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ sent by the corporate
issuer. The reputational intermediary does so by lending or ‘pledging’ its reputational
capital to the corporation, thus enabling investors or the market to rely on the corporation’s own disclosures or assurances where they otherwise might not.”). This said, it
is important to note that the term “gatekeeper” is a metaphor, and is not a description
as such. Indeed, in cases where an in-house legal department hires the services of an
independent firm on difficult legal disputes, the reputation of such an independent
firm may include the ability – either real or imagined – of obtaining favorable results
in questionable cases. Accordingly, in connection with the notion of the corporate
gatekeeper as a reputational intermediary, the gatekeeper in question may also be
viewed as an “usher.” Here, the function of the “usher” – again, in a metaphorical
sense – would be to ensure that that certain persons (or things) would proceed through
the gate to their (or its) proper place, with only the most egregious cases being
stopped in transit. In this sense, corporate attorneys often serve a function that more
resembles that of the usher in that their incentives are often such that passing the gate
(e.g., successfully closing a corporate transaction) is deemed the optimum of professional performance. I thank Professor Hazard for making these important observations.
15. The first article in this series explored the longstanding debate concerning
the appropriate limits of the attorney-client privilege in connection with an internal
corporate investigation. See Hines, supra note 1, at 39. In turn, this second article
will explore the interplay of another core set of rules for legal ethics – that is, conflicts
of interest rules. Although each of these articles should be considered separate inquiries into the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics, the hope and intent is that
applying these two important sets of rules of legal ethics (i.e., privilege and conflicts
rules) to current developments in corporate and securities law will assist further research in such areas of scholarship.
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the corporate and securities law space may be viewed as primarily calling into
question the ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper.16
In support of such an argument, Part II of this Article sets forth a
framework for conflicts of interest scenarios that takes into account four categories of legal rules – activity rules, disclosure rules, liability rules and ethical
rules. Specifically, the discussion of each of the categories of legal rules will
proceed as follows: (i) for activity rules, the restrictions on services offered
by auditors pursuant to section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act;17 (ii) for liability rules, the ongoing debate concerning whether secondary liability under
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act18 should be available to federal securities
class action plaintiffs in light of the Court’s decisions in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver19 and Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.;20 (iii) for disclosure rules, proxy disclosure rules in relation to codes of ethics for senior financial officers21 and
compensation committee independence standards;22 and (iv) for ethical rules,
the relevant rules concerning conflicts of interest as provided in the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility,23 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct24 and the Attorney Conduct Rules.25 In adopting such a framework, an
ethical perspective will be elaborated to address matters within the ongoing
development of corporate and securities law.26
16. Of note, the question of conflicts of interest necessarily implicates questions
as to the independence of the corporate gatekeeper. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2012) (“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”). As will be discussed, the
new rules on independence standards for Compensation Committees as part of the
Dodd-Frank reforms provide an area where one may further explore the more practical application of the discussion provided herein. See infra Part III.A.2.
17. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
19. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
20. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
21. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406.
22. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
23. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY CANONS 5, 9 (1981).
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012).
25. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2012).
26. Given the plethora of regulations that have been or will be promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other administrative agencies
pursuant to Dodd-Frank, by necessity this Article will limit its focus to one regulatory
rule of interest. Specifically, this Article focuses on the independence standards for
Compensation Committees and related proxy disclosure that is currently under consideration. See Dodd-Frank § 952; Listing Standards for Compensation Committees,
76 Fed. Reg. 18966-01 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240); see
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Part III of this Article will discuss in greater detail the primacy of ethical
rules of the corporate gatekeeper by first comparing the categories of conflicts rules as initially described in Part II. In making such a comparison, I
will argue for an ethical perspective in instances where the corporate gatekeeper is an actor.27 Further, I will suggest that such an ethical perspective
may also engage with recent scholarly discourse regarding the theoretical
approaches taken in each of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.28 As a means of further substantiating this line of reasoning, I propose further analysis in relation to disclosure rules on conflicts of interest policies for Compensation Committees as
mandated by Dodd Frank,29 and provides some concluding thoughts on the
manner in which an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper may be
more broadly considered as part of the ongoing development of corporate and
securities law.30

II. CATEGORIES OF CONFLICTS RULES
The categorization of legal rules is a method of inquiry that facilitates
further discussion of matters involving legal theory.31 Without doubt, the
precise definition and resulting scope of any category so constructed may be
also Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act –
Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last modified Sept. 7, 2012) (“[DoddFrank] contains more than 90 provisions that require SEC rulemaking, and dozens of
other provisions that give the SEC discretionary rulemaking authority. Of the mandatory rulemaking provisions, the SEC has proposed or adopted rules for about threequarters of them.”).
27. In arguing for the primacy of ethical rules in this instance, I do not argue for
the relative unimportance of other categories of conflicts rules – i.e., activity rules,
liability rules, and disclosure rules. Indeed, the federal securities regulatory scheme
can be viewed as including all of the categories of conflicts rules as discussed herein.
Nevertheless, the argument made will be that ethical rules should be of primary consideration because of their implications on the other categories of conflicts rules.
Accordingly, the extent to which one may be able to determine the nature and quality
of ethical rules may illuminate further discussion of activity rules, liability rules, and
disclosure rules as part of the ongoing scholarship in this area of law.
28. Here, this Article keeps in mind the discussion amongst Professors Geoffrey
Hazard, David Luban, and Michael Millemann with respect to the theoretical foundations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991) [hereinafter Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics]; David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics
Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995).
29. See Dodd-Frank § 952.
30. See infra Part III.A.2.
31. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Categories, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE:
THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 3, 3-24 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
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challenged,32 which may ultimately lead to a negative thesis that the categorization itself is meaningless.33 Nevertheless, any categorization of legal rules
should ultimately be assessed as to whether it facilitates inquiry into matters
under consideration.34 The question, therefore, is not whether the categories
are true or correct in an absolute sense, but rather, whether such categories
inform the argument being presented.35
Part II of this Article presents one possible categorization of legal rules
concerning conflicts of interest within the context of corporate and securities
law.36 Specifically, this Part sets forth a framework for further discussion by
32. With respect to the categories set forth in this Article, for instance, one might
argue that the distinction between disclosure rules and liability rules is without difference, as a matter of practice. For does not the public company in the United States
follow the particular disclosure rules of federal securities regulation in the shadow of
its potential liability under the general anti-fraud liability rule? See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.1016 (2012). Indeed, much of this makes sense.
Nevertheless, the intended purpose of this categorization is to argue in favor of the
primacy of ethical rules within the context of corporate and securities law where the
corporate gatekeeper is an actor. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
33. This does not mean to imply, however, that any negative thesis is without
merit as part of scholarly discussion. Indeed, a compelling critique of longstanding
opinions and beliefs is often the first step toward more enlightened discussion of legal
rules and their effects. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 210 (1979) (“[T]he activity of categorizing,
analyzing, and explaining legal rules has a double motive. On the one hand, it is an
effort to discover the conditions of social justice. On the other, it is an attempt to
deny the truth of our painfully contradictory feelings about the actual state of relations
between persons in our social world.”).
34. See, e.g., Paul Studtmann, Aristotle’s Categories, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Sept. 7, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/ (“The set of
doctrines in the Categories, which I will henceforth call categorialism, provides the
framework of inquiry for a wide variety of Aristotle’s philosophical investigations,
ranging from his discussions of time and change in the Physics, to the science of being qua being in the Metaphysics, and even extending to his rejection of Platonic
ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics.”).
35. See supra notes 27, 33 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.1; see also
Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An
Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 336-340 (1972) (distinguishing, by definition, in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem adjudicatory authority).
36. Although the number of possible categories of legal rules is infinite, the most
influential remains the fundamental distinction between property rules and liability
rules as part of the law and economics literature. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 965, 979-80 (1997) (“A property rule gives the holder of the right the legal
power to prevent any other party from infringing on that right. A liability rule does
not give the holder of the right the legal power to prevent another party from infringing, but instead gives the holder the right to obtain compensatory damages from the
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first defining and then elaborating on four categories of conflicts rules—
namely, activity rules, liability rules, disclosure rules and ethical rules.37

A. Activity Rules
The first category of legal rules concerning conflicts of interest within
the context of corporate and securities law is called activity rules.38 In this
context, activity rules will be defined as rules of law that prescribe the permitted activity that the corporate gatekeeper may engage in as part of her professional representation of her chosen client.39 Activity rules, therefore, are
fundamentally negative rules in that they prohibit certain activities that the
corporate gatekeeper may undertake.40 In this sense, activity rules can be
viewed as the most stringent of conflicts rules because their mandate is (or at
least should be) rather clear – you can do X, but you cannot do Y.41 In many
cases, however, activity rules will be even more straightforward – you cannot
do X, Y, and Z.42 Accordingly, one would naturally be inclined to conclude
that any activities that are not specifically prohibited by the given activity rule

infringing party. In operational terms, courts typically enforce property rights through
injunctive relief, whereas liability rules are typically enforced through monetary damages.”).
37. See infra Parts II.A-D.
38. Admittedly, one could fashion a different taxonomy for the conflicts rules in
question. For instance, conduct rules could be an alternative phrasing of the rules that
I have in mind. As a means, however, of avoiding any confusion with the Attorney
Conduct Rules, I adopt the term activity rules to provide the necessary distinction.
39. With respect to the corporate gatekeepers that are within the purview of this
discussion, as a preliminary matter we may consider auditors, corporate attorneys,
securities analysts, and the rating agencies. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 14, at 10307.
40. On this prohibitionary aspect of activity rules, there are similarities with
ethical rules as discussed herein. See infra Part II.D. In particular, I have in mind the
requirements of Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules, which prohibit certain activity between
attorneys as their clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2012)
(“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”).
This said, the specific requirements of Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules read to certain
representations that operate as de facto violations of the more general ethical rule on
conflicts of interest, i.e., Model Rule 1.7. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7. For purposes of
this Article, therefore, Model Rule 1.8 may be considered as an ethical rule that in its
effects also operates as an activity rule. See supra note 27; infra Part II.D.
41. On such points, activity rules often raise questions of statutory construction
and interpretation. Given the scope of this Article, however, such questions must
remain without the realm of inquiry.
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006).
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are permissible, provided that they are not otherwise prohibited by other activity rules.43
Given this prohibited/permissible nature of activity rules, it is understandable that they will likely become a point at issue amongst competing
interest groups during the political enactment process.44 This effect results
because the activity rule will delineate clear costs for those market actors who
previously profited in the absence of such activity rules.45 And, presumably,
such market actors will not accept the enactment of the activity rule without
some measure of a political contest.46
With this overview of activity rules in mind, what examples are there of
activity rules that affect the conduct of corporate gatekeepers? Although
other examples of activity rules may provide insight into the manner in which
they operate,47 perhaps the most notable instance of activity rules affecting

43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. On such points, the longstanding and influential scholarship on public choice

theory provides additional discussion and illumination. See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.3 (8th ed. 2011).
45. See id. § 19.3, at 718 (“All this makes interest groups sound pretty bad. But
the real economic objection is not to interest groups but to the use of the political
process to make economic decisions.”).
46. A more recent example of such a political process is the proposed “Volcker
Rule” – named after former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker – as part
of the Dodd-Frank Reforms. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641). By its terms, the Volcker Rule seeks to prohibit “proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds.” Id. As one might imagine, however, the devil remains in the details of
the forthcoming regulation. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY &
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN
RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 4 (2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20stud
y%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
47. See, e.g., SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last
modified Apr. 28, 2003) (“Investment bankers will have no role in determining what
companies are covered by the analysts. Research analysts will be prohibited from
participating in efforts to solicit investment banking business, including pitches and
roadshows.”). Note, however, that the Global Analyst Research Settlements included
other mandates, including what for purposes of this Article may be deemed disclosure
rules. See id. (“Each firm will include a disclosure on the first page of each research
report stating that it ‘does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its
research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a
conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.’”); see also infra
Part II.C.
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the conduct of a gatekeeper is the prescribed activities of auditors as set forth
in Sarbanes-Oxley.48
An important part of the reforms set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley,49 section
201 provides that certain services are outside the scope of practice of auditors.50 Subject to certain restrictions,51 section 201 mandates that it is unlawful for a registered public accounting firm that performs an audit of an issuer,52 to contemporaneously offer to such an issuer any non-audit services,
including the following:
(1) “[B]ookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client;
(2) [F]inancial information systems design and implementation;
(3) [A]ppraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;
(4) [A]ctuarial services;
(5) [I]nternal audit outsourcing services;
(6) [M]anagement functions or human resources;
(7) [B]roker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking
services;
(8) [L]egal services and expert services unrelated to the audit;
and

48. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).
49. For additional discussion regarding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley, see
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.1 (6th ed. 2009)
(“From a long-term perspective, perhaps the most significant aspect of SarbanesOxley is not the enhanced disclosure requirements or criminal penalties, but rather
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes further than any of the earlier federal securities laws
and amendments in dealing directly with corporate governance – an area that had
traditionally been reserved to the states.”).
50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (permitting the rendering of tax services when such
“activity is approved in advance by the audit committee of the issuer”).
52. This may be required under federal securities law and regulation.
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(9) [A]ny other services that the [Public Company Accounting
Oversight] Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.”53
As part of this enumerated list of prohibited activities, section 201 notably prohibits the offering of services that may otherwise have been provided
by a financial advisor or consultant.54 And, these aforementioned specific
activity rules were designed to address what – in the aftermath of the accounting scandals that preceded passage of Sarbanes Oxley – was perceived as a
failing of the regulatory apparatus.55 Namely, auditors did not pay close
enough attention to their audits,56 and became compromised by the allure of
consulting fees from their clients.57
As Professor John Coffee recounts in his important treatment on the
subject, “the growth of consulting revenue as a proportion of accounting
firms’ overall revenues during the 1990s was dramatic . . . . In short, consulting revenues more than doubled over this period and had come to exceed
auditing revenues by a healthy 10 percent.”58 It is within this context that the
economic effect of the activity rules, as set forth in section 201, should be
considered.59 Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the accounting firms
could engage in financial advisory and consulting services. After passage,

53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(9) (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 78j-1(g)(7)-(8).
55. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN
THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON

(2003).

56. See id. at 322 (“[In an interview with Fortune magazine, Former Enron CFO

Andrew] Fastow’s explanation of Enron’s business did not exactly provide the promised clarity. On the contrary. Here’s how Fastow explained Enron’s business model:
‘We create optionality. Enron is so much more valuable – hence our stock price –
because we have so much more optionality embedded in our network than anyone
else.’”).
57. Although the available empirical scholarship on the effects of the rise of
consulting fees is not dispositive, nevertheless the perception remains that the accounting industry changed in a fundamental manner. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note
14, at 150-51. The problem, therefore, became one of culture and the often discussed
“tone at the top.” Id. at 151 (“In some cases, audit services may have been provided
on such a discounted basis that auditing in effect became a ‘loss leader.’ Inherently,
few things are more destructive to a watchdog culture that demands professional
skepticism than to learn that is serves are so little valued as to be given away below
cost.”).
58. Id. at 147. As Professor Coffee notes, accounting and auditing revenue from
all clients at the “Big Five” accounting firms stood at 53% in 1990, and thereafter
declined to 34% in 1999. Id. In contrast, consulting revenues at these same firms
started at 20% in 1990 and rose to 40% by 1999. Id.
59. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1, at 41 n.41 (noting the importance of viewing
the law in a historical context).
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they could not.60 Additionally the new activity rules – that is to say, the prohibitions on the enumerated services as set forth in section 201 – came at the
cost of lost business opportunities for the accounting firms.61
In this sense, activity rules can be viewed as a rather drastic (or Draconian, depending on one’s perspective) form of rulemaking that seeks to curtail
the activity in question.62 In the realm of conflict of interest rules, therefore,
activity rules are typically used to define – or more aptly stated, to re-define –
the realm of conduct for the corporate gatekeeper.63 Prior to the accounting
scandals of Enron, Worldcom, and the rest, the public auditor increasingly
came to be seen as both auditor and consultant. When this fundamental tension between the auditor and consultant roles came to light, and the fallout
from the accounting fraud scandals became a matter of political interest, the
necessary political will was achieved in order to push the activity rules
through the political process.64 Activity rules, therefore, are frequently en-

60. Thus, these financial advisory and consulting services – those purported
occasions of sin – are thrown into the bonfire. See supra note 4.
61. As a practical matter, this “bottom line” of the economic effect of activity
rules is an important consideration as to whether the activity rule in question is efficient. See, e.g., Interview by Charlie Rose with Lloyd Blankfein, CEO, Goldman
Sachs (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view /interview/
10989#frame_top (“ROSE: What would happen to Goldman Sachs if you could no
longer engage in proprietary trading? BLANKFEIN: I think that if we eliminated all
the activity that’s unrelated to client activity of Goldman Sachs we would probably do
away with about 10% of our revenue.”).
62. Perhaps the most notable example of an activity rule in modern U.S. financial history is the famous Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separated commercial
and investment banking and ultimately came undone by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999. See, e.g., RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27 (4th ed. 2009) (“The
once formidable wall between commercial and investment banking fell after long
bombardment.”).
63. See, e.g., SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, supra
note 47.
64. The final vote in favor of passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was 423-3 in the House
and 99-0 in the Senate. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 348, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (July 25, 2002, 12:09 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002
/roll348.xml; U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes for 107th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S.
SENATE (July 25, 2002, 4:30 PM), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call
_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00192. In contrast,
Dodd-Frank passed the House by a margin of 237-192, and in the Senate on a 60-39
vote. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 413, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (June
30, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll413.xml; U.S. Senate Roll
Call Votes 11th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (July 15, 2010, 2:29 PM),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=111&session=2&vote=00208. Based solely on these numbers, the relative lack of
political consensus in the case of Dodd-Frank suggests that the appetite for activity
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acted at moments of heightened political power, because in their effects they
are inherently structural.65 Given that such moments of political power are an
infrequent occurrence, however, additional categories of conflicts rules must
be considered.

B. Liability Rules
A second category of legal rules that addresses matters of conflicts of interest in corporate and securities law is the category of liability rules.66 Although the consideration of liability rules remains a foundational element of
scholarly discourse,67 for purposes of this discussion I will limit the definition
of liability rules to those legal rules that attach liability to the actions (or lack
thereof) of the corporate gatekeeper.68 In this context, therefore, liability
rules raise the essential question – in which circumstances should we hold the
corporate gatekeeper liable for its actions, or failure to act, in connection with
alleged misconduct by its client under the federal securities laws?69 While a
definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article, and

rules – for instance, in the form of the Volcker Rule – was not as prevalent as was the
case with Sarbanes-Oxley.
65. Although the structure or overall form of corporate law and its intersection
with legal ethics merits additional inquiry, such matters will be reserved for the third
article in this series.
66. Again, one could argue for a different taxonomy in relation to such legal
rules. See supra note 38. However, given that the term liability rules is frequently
used in the literature, I adopt such language for purposes of this discussion. See, e.g.,
Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 36, at 1092. This said, the question that necessarily
arises with liability rules is who owes the liability to whom. Liability rules in this
broader context, while certainly worthy of further discussion, are not what is intended
for consideration in this Article. Rather, in invoking the term liability rules, I speak
to gatekeeper liability rules – that is, the legal rules that attach liability to the actions
or inactions of the corporate gatekeeper.
67. See, e.g., Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 36, at 1110 (“[O]nce a liability
rule is decided upon, perhaps for efficiency reasons, it is then employed to favor distributional goals as well.”).
68. See supra note 66.
69. In public discourse, this question is often phrased – where were the gatekeepers? See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408-09 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron]. The implicit premise in posing such a question is that the gatekeepers were not there – a place they should have been – and therefore were in some manner absent or derelict in their duties. One means of ensuring that the gatekeepers are
appropriately engaged (as one may define) in the next case is to incentivize such behavior by enacting a liability rule. Id. at 1405 (“[T]he starting point for responding to
the Enron debacle begins with asking the right question. That question is not: Why
did some managements engage in fraud? But is rather: Why did the gatekeepers let
them?”).
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indeed remains a highly debated point in case law and scholarship,70 nevertheless an exploration of liability rules as a category of conflicts rules will
further illuminate the discussion that surrounds such a difficult question. 71
Liability rules are, in their essential function, a method of compensating
an aggrieved party for the damages caused by another.72 For instance, if you
are a corporate executive and engage in securities fraud,73 presumably your
malfeasance will damage your stockholders through a depressed stock price.74
Accordingly, existing law makes such executives liable to their shareholders
in a state derivative suit75 and federal securities class action.76 The instances
in which such liability attaches are matters, therefore, that are further addressed in the relevant federal and state statutes and regulations,77 as well as
under applicable decisional law.78 Thus, it is unsurprising to find that any
possible changes to liability rules are points of contention that – in a manner
similar to activity rules – will cause the political debate to be joined.79 In
such cases, the interest group that may classify as an aggrieved party would
70. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
158 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 166-67 (1994); Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future
After Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351 (2009); Joseph Grundfest, Is There an Express Section 10(b) Private Right of Action? A Response to Professor Prentice (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 352, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077437; Robert A. Prentice,
Scheme Liability: A Reply to Grundfest (McCombs Research Paper Series No. IROM03-07, 2007), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1030525; Joseph Grundfest, Scheme Liability: A Question for Congress, Not for
the Court (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance Stanford Univ. Working Paper No.
12, Stanford Univ. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 344, Stanford Univ. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 1005524, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1005524.
71. See infra Part III.A.
72. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 979-80.
73. See HAZEN, supra note 49, §§ 12.3, 12.4 (describing remedies for fraud in
the sale or trade of securities).
74. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (“The fraud on
the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities
market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements . . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.”) (citation omitted).
75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Laws).
76. See HAZEN, supra note 49, §§ 7.17, 12.15.
77. See id. §1.2 (reviewing the history and scope of federal and state regulations).
78. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
79. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

15

File: HinesPaginated.docx

Created on: 10/21/13 9:21 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3 Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM

92

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

more naturally be in favor of the liability rule, while the potential compensating party will be decidedly opposed to the rule because it will necessarily
increase its cost of doing business.80 In this sense, liability rules present a
struggle between two competing interest groups as to who should compensate
for what and to whom.81
An example of this extended contest that often surrounds liability rules
is the longstanding debate regarding the availability of a private cause of action for secondary liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.82
As a matter of legal history, the current debate over secondary liability
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act began in earnest in 1994 with the
Court’s decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.83 Further, the debate continued with the more recent 2008 decision of the Court
regarding “scheme” liability in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta.84 Taken together, these cases provide the doctrinal context85 in
which one may further explore liability rules as a category for conflicts rules
in the area of corporate and securities law.86
80. In connection with such increased costs, the question of a possible increase
in agency costs remains an important area of inquiry. See, e.g., George M. Cohen,
When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
273, 280 (1998) (“Law and economics scholars have used agency theory to analyze
the client-lawyer relationship. Examples of lawyer conduct that have been traced to
agency cost problems include misusing client confidential information for the lawyer’s personal gain, favoring one client’s interests over another’s, and increasing or
skewing the demand for legal services in ways that benefit the lawyer but not the
client.”). But see Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
301, 301 (1998) (“Lawyers are more than their client’s agents. Lawyers are officers
of the court, thus subjecting themselves to the court’s supervision and to duties geared
to protect the vigor, fairness, and integrity of processes of litigation. Furthermore, as
members of a profession, lawyers are subject to duties not neatly captured by the
consequences of agency.”).
81. As a matter of practice, this would be more generally recognized as the
somewhat unfortunate but all together common human behavior of pointing the finger
at another.
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Othello, in THE RIVERSIDE
SHAKESPEARE
1251,
1279
(G.
Blakemore
Evans
& J.J. M. Tobin eds., Houghton Mifflin Company 1997) (1622) (“[A]las, to make me
[t]he fixed figure for the time of scorn [t]o point his slow [unmoving] finger at!”).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
83. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
84. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
85. Thus, while the particular facts of Central Bank and Stoneridge do not directly concern corporate gatekeepers as previously defined, nevertheless the doctrinal
rules that result from such cases illustrate the nature and quality of liability rules in
this context.
86. Although one could argue that Central Bank and Stoneridge are not cases
that specifically or perhaps even necessarily implicate issues of conflicts of interest,
this category of liability rules, as defined, seeks to facilitate discussion of not only
conflicts of interest rules, in and of themselves, but also the principles of independ-
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1. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
The facts in Central Bank concerned certain bonds issued by the Colorado-Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority in the amount of $26
million in order to “finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned
residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs.”87 Pursuant to
the financing papers, Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for
the bonds in question, which were secured by certain real estate interests.88
As part of the financing, AmWest, the developer of Stetson Hills, covenanted
to provide an annual report that such real estate interests had value of at least
160% of the outstanding principal and interest on the bonds.89 In light of a
decline in real estate values, Central Bank performed an in-house appraisal of
the real estate interests in question.90 The in-house appraisal determined that
the stated values for such interests were “optimistic.”91 After exchanging
letters with AmWest, Central Bank agreed to a delay of an independent review of the real estate appraisal, which permitted a second tranche of the
bond issues to close.92 In due time, however, the Colorado-Springs Stetson
Hills Public Building Authority defaulted on this second tranche of bonds.93
In such circumstances, the question before the Court was whether Central Bank was “secondarily liable under [Section] 10(b) for its conduct in
aiding and abetting the fraud.”94 In light of Central Bank’s role as indenture
trustee, the issue of secondary liability became a critical point of concern. In
other words, Central Bank did not issue the bonds, but rather operated in a
facilitating role per the terms of the indenture.95 Accordingly, a claim for a
primary violation of section 10(b) by Central Bank would be difficult to sub-

ence that serve as the theoretical foundation for such rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2012). Accordingly, by fashioning this category
of liability rules, I seek to further explore the manner in which conflicts rules, broadly
considered, may be addressed within the space of corporate and securities law.
87. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 167.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 167-68.
91. Id. at 167.
92. Id. at 168.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the
Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2008) (“Absent default, the indenture trustee’s duties to bondholders are straightforward and, indeed,
even ministerial. In the event of default, however, those duties are governed by a
‘prudent man’ standard.”).
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stantiate.96 But could investors in the bonds sue Central Bank on a theory of
aiding and abetting liability?
The Court responded in the negative in a 5-4 decision.97 In particular,
the Court primarily relied upon the argument that Congressional intent was
lacking in this instance. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that “there would
be no logical stopping point to this line of reasoning”98 of inferring private
causes of action from the federal criminal statutory provision on aiding and
abetting liability. Both the public and scholarly reaction to Central Bank was
mixed at best.99 Nevertheless, could an alternative theory of “scheme” liability prevail where the aiding and abetting liability claimed in Central Bank had
failed?

2. Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta
In Stoneridge, investors in Charter Communications, Inc. filed suit
against the company for falsely reporting financial information in order to
meet Wall Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash
flow.100 In particular, the investors alleged that Charter Communications
engaged in transactions of no economic substance (i.e., sham transactions) in
order to create the appearance of increased revenues.101 Indeed, the investors

96. As an elaboration, this would be so due to the fact that indenture trustees
customarily do not actively engage in the marketing of bonds in a manner which
would satisfy the requirement that such indenture trustee made a material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase and sale of the bonds. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
97. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. at 185 (“In sum, it is not plausible to
interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to
impose [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.”).
98. Id. at 190-91.
99. As part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress
provided that the SEC may bring actions against persons on an aiding and abetting
liability theory. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t (2006). However, this left unaddressed the possibility of a private right of action by investors, which remains an issue within the scholarship. See, e.g., Susan
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1236, 1279 (2003) (“Aiding and abetting liability for lawyers must be restored, and the level of scienter necessary for liability should be returned to recklessness for private suits and for actions brought by the SEC.”); Roger C. Cramton, Enron
and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143,
182 (2002) (“The Central Bank case should be overruled by legislative action.”).
100. 552 U.S. 148, 152-53 (2008).
101. Id. at 154 (“The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but,
because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize
its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting princi-
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alleged that Scientific-America and Motorola, each of whom were counterparties to contracts with Charter Communications, actively engaged in these
sham transactions.102 For instance, the investors alleged that ScientificAmerica falsely indicated an increase in its production costs,103 while both
Scientific-America and Motorola backdated certain advertising agreements in
order to hide from the company’s auditor that these transactions had no economic value.104
Unlike the facts in Central Bank, therefore, the plaintiffs in Stoneridge
appeared to have a stronger case against the secondary actors – in this case,
the counterparties to contract, Scientific-America and Motorola.105 However,
the problem for the investors was that neither Scientific-America nor Motorola had misstated the financial information of Charter Communications.106
The question, therefore, was whether the investors could impose “scheme
liability” on Scientific-America and Motorola in the absence of either company making specific disclosure in respect of the relevant transactions.107
Once again, the Court responded in the negative.108 In particular, the Court
held that the reliance requirement for a section 10(b) action was not satisfied
because “it was Charter, not [Scientific-America and Motorola], that misled
its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing [ScientificAmerica and Motorola] did made it necessary or inevitable for Charter to
record the transactions as it did.”109
When considered together, the Court’s rulings in Central Bank and
Stoneridge illustrate how difficult it is to define – or, once again, to redefine –
the liability that attaches to secondary actors to the corporation.110 And while
both Central Bank and Stoneridge involved entities that are not typically considered within the definition of the corporate gatekeeper, the liability rules set
forth in each of these cases apply to each of the corporate attorney, auditor,
securities analyst, and ratings agency.111 Therefore, it appears that liability
rules are quite similar to activity rules in that they are rules enacted, in some
ples, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers.”).
102. Id. at 154-55.
103. Id. at 154.
104. Id. at 154-55.
105. See id. at 168-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 155 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 159-160.
108. Id. at 159-161.
109. Id. at 161.
110. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112 (1962)
(“The expected costs of organizing decisions, under any given rule, will be less in the
smaller unit than in the larger, assuming that the populations of each are roughly
comparable.”); POSNER, supra note 44, § 19.3.
111. See supra note 85.
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sense, in a moment of political violence.112 One side will prevail, and the
other side will fail.113 And to the winner go the spoils – that is, the damages
mandated by the new liability rule that will compensate for the alleged
wrongs.114 In such circumstances, the possibility of enacting new activity
rules and/or liability rules without the necessary political will appears remote
at best.115 Other categories of conflicts rules must therefore be discussed.

C. Disclosure Rules
The third category of legal rules on conflicts of interest in the context of
corporate and securities law is the category of disclosure rules.116 For purposes of this discussion, I will broadly define disclosure rules as those legal
rules concerning the registration and reporting process for publicly traded
companies under federal securities law and regulation.117 Disclosure rules,
therefore, are legal rules that are best captured in the famous remarks of Justice Brandeis: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”118 As a matter of legal history, such an approach to securities regulation was the hallmark of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s thinking toward federal legislation in respect of such business
activities.119 Accordingly, in discussing disclosure rules, we concern our112. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721278056345271.html (“‘You never want
a serious crisis to go to waste,’ Rahm Emanuel, Mr. Obama’s new chief of staff, told
a Wall Street Journal conference of top corporate chief executives this week.”).
113. Anglo-American legal history provides the antecedents for such an approach
to dispute resolution. See, e.g., DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 159 (2nd ed. 2004) (“‘Battle’ was the
original mode of proof for the writ of right. It also fell from favor after the Fourth
Lateran Council (1215). Battle, like oaths, technically survived into the 19th century.
Indeed, it was only abolished in 1819 by statute after a party tried to use it to bring an
appeal of felony in the case of Ashford v. Thornton (1818), 1 B. & Ald. 405.”).
114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 979.
115. See supra notes 44, 78 and accompanying text.
116. For purposes of this Article, I do not address matters of state securities or
“blue sky” laws. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 49, § 8.1 (“Section 18(b) of the 1933
Act, as enacted by the [National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996], provides that a number of securities offerings will be exempted from state law regulation
in terms of registration and reporting requirements. Notwithstanding the curtailing of
state law regulatory jurisdiction, state antifraud provisions are preserved.”).
117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78pp (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.1016 (2012).
118. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1914) [hereinafter BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY].
119. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 41
(3rd ed. 2003) (“[President Franklin D. Roosevelt] approached the problem of securi-
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selves with foundational rules of the federal securities regulatory regime.120
Moreover, while in recent years federal securities law and regulation may
have encroached into the historical role of states in respect of corporate governance,121 the fact remains that the federal securities regulatory system is
primarily a system that mandates and enforces disclosure rules.122
As noted previously, the distinction between disclosure rules and liability rules has a tendency to blur in practice.123 For purposes of this categorization, however, this distinction will be preserved in order to facilitate consideration of these different species of legal rules.124 For instance, suppose that
Corporation X discloses in its proxy statement that CEO Y will receive $50
million in aggregate compensation.125 Suppose further that, in point of fact,
CEO Y will receive $50 million and one cent in aggregate compensation.126
In each case, the amount of aggregate compensation must be disclosed pursuant to a disclosure rule, as defined previously.127 But is the difference in disclosed compensation – that is, the lonely cent that did not make it into the
final draft for the printers – a matter that will also trigger a liability rule?128
One thinks not, because the misstatement of one cent will probably not con-

ties regulation with the instincts of a progressive politician in the Wilson and Brandeis
tradition, rather than of an economist concerned with the larger questions of capital
allocation and economic recovery. Rarely did Roosevelt speak about the stock market
without invoking the title of Louis Brandeis’s celebrated study, Other People’s
Money. Like Brandeis, Roosevelt viewed the need to reform securities sales practices
primarily as stemming from the self-interest of investment bankers, primarily the
House of Morgan. Like Brandeis, Roosevelt believed the moral delicts of the bankers
would be curbed when fully exposed to public scrutiny.”).
120. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Jan. 24,
2013) (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires
public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public.”).
121. See HAZEN, supra note 49, § 22.1 (giving an overview of the intersection of
many state and federal securities regulation laws).
122. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 120.
123. See supra note 32.
124. But see Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210 (discussing the act of categorizing
legal rules as a method of inquiry).
125. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2012).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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stitute a material misstatement of executive compensation for purposes of
section 10(b) liability.129
Thus, while disclosure rules and liability rules are undoubtedly connected – indeed, they may be seen as two sides of the same coin under federal
securities law and regulation – the difference in their fundamental nature remains.130 Disclosure rules mandate disclosure. Liability rules mandate liability.131 And, therefore, disclosure rules, in and of themselves, should be further explored as part of this categorization. In particular, the proxy disclosure
of codes of ethics for senior financial officers132 as well as the proposed disclosure rules for compensation committee independence standards133 provide
us with examples of disclosure rules in practice.134

1. Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers
The first example of a disclosure rule, for purposes of this discussion,135
is the requirement that companies subject to Regulation S-K must disclose
their ethical codes.136 Specifically, section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley mandated
that the SEC issue rules to “require each issuer . . . to disclose whether or not,
129. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5; SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (Aug.
12, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2011)).
130. See supra note 32. A more recent example of the interconnection of disclosure rules and liability rules is the historic $550 million settlement between the SEC
and Goldman Sachs in relation to certain trading in subprime mortgage collateralized
debt obligations (“CDOs”). See Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 21595, No. Civ. 3229 (Jul. 15, 2010). In particular,
Goldman Sachs acknowledged that marketing materials for a certain CDO transaction
“contained incomplete information” in that it failed to disclose that Paulson & Co.,
Inc., a noted hedge fund, engaged in the selection process for the referenced portfolio.
See id.
131. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 1, at 40 n.37.
132. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).
133. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
134. Although there are numerous examples of disclosure rules under federal
securities law and regulation, I have selected the proxy disclosure related to codes of
ethics for senior financial officers and the newly enacted compensation committee
independence standards in that they provide us with useful examples of the intersection of corporate law with legal ethics. See supra note 13.
135. Again while this particular disclosure rule does not read to the corporate
gatekeeper but to her client – here, the senior financial officers – nevertheless the
illustration of this disclosure rule provides context for purposes of this categorization.
See supra note 85.
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2012).
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and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for
senior financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar
functions”.137
In response to this Congressional mandate, the SEC promulgated Item
406 of Regulation S-K that requires, inter alia, the disclosure of such a code
of ethics.138 Further, the SEC defined the term “code of ethics” as meaning:
[W]ritten standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote: (1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the
ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between
personal and professional relationships; (2) Full, fair, accurate,
timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and documents
that a registrant files with, or submits to, the Commission and in
other public communications made by the registrant; (3) Compliance with applicable governmental law, rules and regulations; (4)
The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code; and (5) Accountability for adherence to the code.139
Here, therefore, is an example of the intersection of corporate law with
legal ethics in the form of a disclosure rule.140 More specifically, Item 406
provides for the disclosure of a code of ethics that addresses the issue of conflicts of interest.141
But what information in respect of conflicts of interest is being disclosed
by registrants pursuant to this disclosure rule?142 And further to such considSarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a).
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a) (2012).
See id. § 229.406(b) (emphasis added).
For purposes of this Article, however, I use the term “corporate law” in a
wider sense to include matters that are more specifically addressed in federal securities law and regulation. While the interrelation of state corporation law and federal
securities law remains an important area of inquiry in the scholarship, such matters
are without the scope of this Article. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
LAW § 1.2, at 8 (2d ed. 2009) (“Indeed, publicly held corporations can be said to function in a dual regulatory scheme: federal securities law and state corporate law.”). As
for a possible definition of legal ethics, I will adopt a wider meaning as well. See,
e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 3 (2004) [hereinafter HAZARD & DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS] (“‘Legal Ethics’ includes not only ethical conventions of the legal profession but also legal regulations
prescribed by the authority of the state.”).
141. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b).
142. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in
Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“[A]t least for relatedparty transactions, firms regularly engage in a kind of ‘disclosure arbitrage,’ neglecting to disclose ethics waivers at the time when transactions occur (in violation of
137.
138.
139.
140.
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erations, are there other disclosure rules that we might consider as examples
of the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics?

2. Compensation Committee Independence Standards
A second example of a disclosure rule that lies at the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics is the newly enacted independence standards for
compensation committees and related proxy disclosure to such standards.143
In particular, section 952 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to issue by rule, or
direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to
promulgate such rules, whereby certain independence standards will apply for
compensation committees.144 Further, section 952 requires the SEC to define
by rule certain factors that may affect the “independence”145 of the relevant
compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser to a compensation
committee of an issuer:
(A) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person that
employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser; (B) the amount of fees received from the issuer by the person
that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other
adviser . . . ; (C) the policies and procedures of the person that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser
that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest; (D) any business
or personal relationship of the compensation consultant, legal
counsel, or other adviser with a member of the compensation
committee; and (E) any stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other adviser.146
Here, once again, we find a legal rule that touches upon both corporate
law and legal ethics in its requirement that conflicts of interest policies and
procedures must preserve the independence of the compensation consultant,
legal counsel, or other adviser.147

Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley), but disclosing related-party transactions in their
year-end proxy statements as required by Item 404 of Regulation S-K.”).
143. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
144. See id. § 952(a).
145. See generally Christopher T. Hines, Tatsuya Tanigawa & Andrew P. Hughes,
Doing Deals in Japan: An Analysis of Recent Trends and Developments for the U.S.
Practitioner, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 355, 413 n.144 (2006).
146. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)(2) (emphasis added).
147. Id.
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While this independence rule is not a disclosure rule as such,148 section
952 of Dodd-Frank later provides for the disclosure in corporate proxy materials of whether:
(A) the compensation committee of the issuer retained or obtained
the advice of a compensation consultant; and (B) the work of the
compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if
so, the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed.149
Here, therefore, is an additional disclosure rule that implicates matters of
both corporate law and legal ethics.
In addition, the SEC has issued a final rule pursuant to the mandates of
section 952.150 However, since the relevant disclosure in proxy statements
pursuant to such rule is currently unavailable, as of present it is not completely clear what specific information will be provided by means of this new
disclosure rule.151 Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present categorization,
the definition of disclosure rules becomes clearer.

D. Ethical Rules
The fourth and final category of legal rules in the area of corporate and
securities law is ethical rules.152 In many ways, this last category of ethical

148. Indeed, the independence rule would more properly be considered as a corporate governance rule. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 140, § 5.7(B).
149. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(c).
150. Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, 77 Fed. Reg. 38,422 (June
27, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240).
151. Comments to the SEC proposed rule identified a number of points that required additional consideration. See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair of the
Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, to U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 12 (Jun. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1311/s71311-57.pdf (“We do not believe that it is appropriate for the Commission to
expand the Section 10C(c)(2) disclosure requirement to cover both actual and potential conflicts of interest.”); Letter from Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Assoc. Professor, Columbia Law Sch., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (May 19, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-52.pdf (“While the exact design of
the disclosure is beyond the scope of these preliminary comments, companies should
at least be required to disclose which attorneys advised the compensation committee
on executive pay – and any potential conflict of interest these lawyers may face.”).
152. Although this category of ethical rules undoubtedly and perhaps even necessarily touches upon the prior categories of activity rules, liability rules, and disclosure
rules, I believe that there is merit in distinguishing ethical rules from these other categories for reasons that will be made clear. See infra Part III.A.
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rules presents the greatest challenge as a matter of taxonomy.153 What is an
ethical rule under law?154 Is it necessarily a moral rule, and if so, what then
are the connections (if any) between law, ethics and morality?155 Further,
what of the notion of professionalism or professional ethics as such terms are
commonly used in scholarship?156 What then do we mean to say when employing such language in scholarly discourse, or perhaps more tellingly what
do we not mean?157
As a means of facilitating further discussion on such points, this Article
seeks to adopt a more neutral phraseology in relation to these fundamental
questions.158 Thus, I employ the term ethical rule as a conscious effort to
153. Indeed, the definition of one’s “ethics” may be viewed as the normative act
itself. For once certain behavior or other relevant thought or action becomes by definition unethical, then by necessity it will not be ethical. In this sense, the categorization of ethics brings substance to the form. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210
(discussing the act of categorizing legal rules as a method of inquiry).
154. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J.
448, 453 (1995) (“By ‘ethics,’ I mean norms shared by a group on a basis of mutual
and usually reciprocal recognition. Ethics, as thus defined, is essentially a two-party
transaction . . . . The term ‘ethics’ comes to us from the Greek ethikos, a word which
signified a custom or usage. Thus, the term refers to a norm having the characteristic
of being understood in a community . . . . [E]thics entails a dimension of outward
manifestation resulting in communication within the relevant community and a dimension of historical sequence through which an idea manifested at one period is
remembered at a subsequent period.”).
155. In answering such a question, of course, lies the fundamental distinction
between natural law and legal positivist approaches to law. See, e.g., ROBERT L.
HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 1-10, 74-80 (2d ed.
2002).
156. See, e.g., COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR. ASS’N, “. . . IN THE SPIRIT
OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (“‘Professionalism’ is an elastic concept the meaning
and application of which are hard to pin down. That is perhaps as it should be. The
term has a rich, long-standing heritage, and any single definition runs the risk of being
too confining.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics,
40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (1992) (“The term ‘professional ethics’ can be understood to refer to at least three different but related normative sources: first, the profession’s rules of ethics; second, ethical tradition including professional myths, lore and
narrative; and, third, the standards of conduct that an observing anthropologist would
describe as the profession’s conventions of actual practice. The last source may also
be captured by the term ‘habit’ which at one time was used to describe a group’s
regular pattern of conduct.”).
157. See supra note 156. Definition is, therefore, a decision – that is to say, a
decision as to the precise ambit of the ethics under consideration. This said, the interpretation of such definitions is a matter beyond the scope of inquiry in this article.
158. Without doubt, alternative terms may be used by those with a contrary perspective to the conclusions that I draw in this Article. Nevertheless, the intention is to
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provide common language that may be utilized when forming arguments
from numerous perspectives on law.159 Further, I make the initial distinction
between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules.160 In this
respect, the intention is once again to provide such language that may be useful in furthering scholarly discussion on such points.161 But before turning to
the distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical rules,
it is helpful to more fully enunciate the meaning of the term ethical rule as
used for the purposes of the present discussion.
The more frequently used phrase in modern discourse is the word professionalism or professional ethics.162 But what does this phrase mean? As
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Deborah Rhode explain, “‘Profession’ comes
from the Latin, professionem, meaning to make a public declaration. The
term evolved to describe occupations that required new entrants to take an
oath professing their dedication to the ideals and practices associated with a
learned calling.”163 While the origins of the term profession may be clear,
however, the manner in such it is employed has not been entirely consistent
over time.164 Nevertheless, a consistency in the usage of the term professional or its variants (i.e., professionalism, professional ethics) is, in some
fashion, an effort to achieve greater virtue on the part of the profession in
question.165
make the language employed as neutral as may be possible, given the inherent limitations of the written word. Accordingly, one may view this taxonomy as placeholders
of sorts for the concepts that are being explored in developing the lines of argumentation as set forth herein. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD vii
(1972) (“[E]very legal problem – whether it concern the ‘great issues’ of civil disobedience or the hum-drum matters of Offer and Acceptance and Last Clear Chance –
has its roots and perhaps its analog in traditionally ‘philosophical’ realms. Strip away
the technical terms, plumb the debate’s assumptions, and a host of implicit philosophical positions will be found.”).
159. See id. at 403.
160. See infra Parts II.D.1-2.
161. Without some measure of agreement as to the language being employed, one
imagines that further discussion as to areas of disagreement cannot be fully explored.
We must, therefore, first agree on the language being used prior to any disagreement
as to subsequent argumentation. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 691 (“In the most
recent decade, the call [to ‘do the right thing’] has been expressed in terms of ‘professionalism.’ In earlier years, the call was expressed as a demand that lawyers dedicate
themselves to ‘serving the public interest’ and in Victorian times it was expressed in
terms of the ‘honor of the legal profession.’”).
163. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 2 (3d ed. 1994).
164. See Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 691-92.
165. See id. at 691 (“[T]he quest is for greater virtue on the part of lawyers, both
individually and as a member of the profession.”); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and
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Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of “profession” is found in
Professor Wasserstrom’s influential article on the subject matter.166 Given its
importance within the scholarship, it may be helpful to quote at length:
Because of the significance for my analysis of the closely related
concepts of a profession and professional, it will be helpful to indicate at the outset what I take to be the central features of a profession. . . .
. . .There are, I think, at least six that are worth noting.
(1) The professions require a substantial period of formal education
– at least as much if not more than that required by any other occupation. . . .
(2) The professions require the comprehension of a substantial
amount of theoretical knowledge and the utilization of a substantial
amount of intellectual ability . . . .
(3) The professions are both an economic monopoly and largely
self-regulating. Not only is the practice of the profession restricted
to those who are certified as possessing the requisite competencies,
but the questions of what competencies are required and who possesses them are questions that are left to the members of the profession to decide for themselves. . . .
(4) The professions are clearly among the occupations that possess
the greatest social prestige in the society. They also typically provide a degree of material affluence substantially greater than that
enjoyed by most working persons. . . .
(5) The professions are almost always involved with matters which
from time to time are among the greatest personal concerns that
humans have: physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the
like. As a result, persons who seek the services of a professional

Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885,
940 (1996) (arguing that “highly technocratic lawyers” cannot be good ethical deliberators).
166. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). But see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There
Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 131 (2001) (“The
questions articulated by Wasserstrom and accepted by so many legal scholars as central to legal ethics do not fit the patterns of later lawyer scandals any better than they
fit Watergate.”).
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are often in a state of appreciable concern, if not vulnerability,
when they do so. . . .
(6) The professions almost always involve at their core a significant inter-personal relationship between the professional, on the
one hand, and the person who is thought to require the professional’s services: the patient or the client.167
Professions, therefore, are an elite of sorts within society with certain
prescribed privileges and responsibilities that are obtained upon the completion of rigorous academic training and achievement.168 As Tocqueville famously observed: “Hidden at the bottom of the souls of lawyers one therefore
finds a part of the tastes and habits of aristocracy. They have its instinctive
penchant for order, its natural love of forms; they conceive its great disgust
for the actions of the multitude and secretly scorn the government of the people.”169
This notion of the professional as a class that is separate and distinct
from others in society is a reality that is often at odds with fundamental principles of American culture.170 Such tension between the necessity for profes167. Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1 (emphasis added).
168. See id.
169. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 252 (Harvey C. Mans-

field & Delba Winthrop eds., University of Chicago Press 2000) (1835). Although
this quotation from Tocqueville is often cited, its precise meaning is frequently lost or
misunderstood. See, e.g., Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1272
(“It is important to contrast Tocqueville’s view of aristocracy with what seems to be a
widely shared contemporary misinterpretation of that concept. In present-day American usage, ‘aristocracy’ signifies a class constituted by inheritance, endowed with
unearned wealth and income, and privileged to remain in idleness. Its members enjoy
their status by an accident of history and interject themselves in serious matters only
occasionally and then merely as a matter of personal choice. This concept of an aristocracy calls up images of the English country house dilettantes of the Victorian era . .
. . Yet Tocqueville assumes that an ‘aristocratic element’ must exist even in a democracy, and finds it in the legal profession and in ‘those who have turned to industry.’
In Jeffersonian terms – perhaps compatible with democratic ideology – members of
the legal profession would be a ‘natural aristocracy,’ as distinct from an inherited
one.”).
170. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order
to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.”); Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at
1241 (“The bar’s ambiguous standards of competence, for example, can be attributed
to such external realities as the wide variety of constituencies seeking legal services,
the diversity of aspirants for legal careers, and – above all – fundamental tendencies
in the American social environment: its unacknowledged social stratification, disdain
for elitism, and aversion to regulatory controls on personal behavior.”).
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sions within the greater political economy and the tendencies of an antiestablishment culture often leads to the most natural of results – professionals, and lawyers in particular, are not exceedingly popular in the United
States.171 But such cultural phenomena aside, the reality remains that the task
must be completed – and, therefore, the professions must seek to complete
their appointed task.172
One of the most important tasks of professions is their self-regulation.173
While reasonable minds may disagree as to whether such an approach is natural or whether alternatives may be desired,174 this is the current state of affairs

171. See, e.g., Hazard, Doing the Right Thing, supra note 11, at 701 (“I submit
that the opprobrium is essentially what psychiatrists call ‘projection.’ . . . The lawyer’s vocation is living testimony to the discrepancy between the community’s ethical
aspirations and its merely human condition. It may also be that the availability of
lawyers to deal with some of these discrepancies permits other members of the community to imagine themselves above such unpleasantness and allows them to live in
an imaginary world.”); Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987) (“Lawyers, it seems, can’t
win for trying. They are simultaneously praised and blamed for the very same actions.”). This said, the interrelationship of the professions with greater society need
not always be this strained. For instance, in Japan the notion that there is a legal elite
is an accepted reality for the larger society in question. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan, 34
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 459-477 (2003). But what one culture may accept, another may freely deny as a matter of choice or, more likely, historical path dependence. And therein lies the difference for the professions when properly considering
their ethical rules within the fabric of larger social discourse. Or, to put the question
plainly, to which culture are you fashioning the ethical rule? See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 38 (Henry
Hardy ed., 1990) (“In order to understand a culture, one must employ the same faculties of sympathetic insight with which we understand one another, without which
there is neither love nor friendship, nor true human relationships.”); HAZARD &
DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 140, at 2 (“Every legal system has a distinct cultural character, and there is much variance in legal systems even among the Western
regimes.”).
172. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1. Here, Professor Wasserstrom’s
observations ring true that “[t]he professions are almost always involved with matters
which from time to time are among the greatest personal concerns that humans have:
physical health, psychic well-being, liberty, and the like.” Id. Some measure of opprobrium is, one must imagine, a small price to pay in the face of such important
responsibilities. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071-72 (1976) (“To be sure, the
lawyer’s range of concern is sharply limited. But within that limited domain the intensity of identification with the client’s interests is the same.”).
173. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1 n.1.
174. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (2003) [hereinafter Coffee, The Attorney as
Gatekeeper] (“The blunt truth is that private self-regulation of attorneys through bar
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of the professions.175 This Article, therefore, addresses the professions in
their current state and not necessarily in their desired form.176 More specifically, this Article considers the professional qua gatekeeper177 in a manner
consistent with the ongoing scholarship on corporate gatekeepers.178 In taking such an approach, the intersection of corporate law and legal ethics will
be further explored.179 And as a means to further such lines of inquiry, the
initial distinction between first-order ethical rules and second-order ethical
rules becomes necessary.180

1. First-Order Ethical Rules
A first-order ethical rule is, for purposes of this discussion, a rule of ethics as may be prescribed by the relevant profession.181 Accordingly, the firstassociations means the continued government of the guild, by the guild, and for the
guild.”).
175. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 10 (2012) (“The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other
professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is
unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the
processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the
fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.”).
176. This said, I do not intend to provide a purely descriptive argument, but also
include some possible prescriptions in federal securities law and regulation. See infra
Part III.A.2.
177. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 21 (“The lawyer qua professional is, of
necessity, only centrally interested in that part of the client that lies within his or her
special competency.”).
178. See, e.g., Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); see generally COFFEE, supra
note 14.
179. See supra note 13.
180. See infra Parts II.D.1-2. Notably, this distinction between first-order ethical
rules and second-order ethical rules should not be confused with the distinction of
primary and secondary rules. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed.
1994) (“Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers,
public or private.”).
181. In using the phrase first-order ethical rule, I do not mean to suggest that such
rules are necessarily more important or in some fashion superior to what will later be
described as a second-order ethical rule. The effort, once again, is to provide a taxonomy of ethical rules that will facilitate further discussion. Indeed, the distinction
between a first-order ethical rule and second-order ethical should be considered as
primarily one of logic. See Herbert B. Enderton, Second-Order and Higher-Order
Logic, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (MAR. 4, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/logic-higher-order/ (“Second-order logic is an extension of first-order logic where, in
addition to quantifiers such as ‘for every object (in the universe of discourse),’ one
has quantifiers such as ‘for every property of objects (in the universe of discourse).’
This augmentation of the language increases its expressive strength, without adding
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order ethical rule is an ethical rule of the first-order precisely because it is
enunciated by the relevant profession as matter of self-regulation.182 Again,
while reasonable minds may disagree as to whether first-order ethical rules
should be promulgated in the current fashion or whether alternatives may be
desirable,183 nevertheless the reality remains that first-order ethical rules do
exist for the professional qua gatekeeper.184 More specifically, the first-order
ethical rules for corporate attorneys are those model rules of legal ethics as
drafted by the American Bar Association (“ABA”),185 and as further enunciated and enforced by the bar associations and courts in the various states.186
Therefore, the ABA rules on the ethics of the legal profession and the historical development thereof are the focus of this discussion.187
As a matter of legal history, it may be helpful to first recall the precise
manner in which the self-regulation of attorneys commenced in the United
States.188 Although the antecedents of the professional regulation of attorneys read back to the nineteenth century in the United States,189 and even as
far back as the thirteenth century in England,190 the first comprehensive ethi-

new non-logical symbols, such as new predicate symbols. For classical extensional
logic (as in this entry), properties can be identified with sets, so that second-order
logic provides us with the quantifier ‘for every set of objects.’”).
182. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 10 (2012); Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1.
183. See, e.g., Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 174, at 1316.
184. See MODEL RULES Scope ¶ 19 (“Failure to comply with an obligation or
prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”).
185. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7-1.13; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
Canons 5, 9 (1981).
186. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 8-9 (2d ed. 2007).
187. See generally CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASSOC., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005 143-318 (2006).
188. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 199-202 (detailing the historical evolution of
the modern MODEL RULES).
189. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the
Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 471 (1998) (“[T]he Model
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
owe much of their content to the first code of ethics for lawyers officially adopted in
the United States: the 1887 code of ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association.”). In
this effort at codification, the prior work of George Sharswood and David Hoffman
were particularly influential. See id. at 493-97.
190. See, e.g., Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (“In the late thirteenth century,
three critical regulations were adopted: the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29
(1275), the London Ordinance of 1280, and the Ordinance of 1292, de Attornatis et
Apprenticiis.”).
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cal “code”191 for attorneys in the United States took the form of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.192 The impetus for such codification of ethical
rules came from a speech by President Theodore Roosevelt given in 1905,
where he made the following observation:
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical contempt for those prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he
can escape or evade is a menace to our community; and the community is not to be excused if it does not develop a spirit which actively frowns on and discountenances him. The great profession of
the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the
lead in the creation of just such a spirit. We all know that, as
things actually are, many of the most influential and most highly
remunerated members of the bar in every centre of wealth make it
their special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which
their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the
laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use
of great wealth.193
In response to this call for action, the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908.194 In comparison to the current rules of professional
ethics the Canons of Professional Ethics are somewhat antiquated.195 The
adoption of these Canons meant the Rubicon had been crossed; there now

191. See generally UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI,
SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW 384 (7th ed. 2009) (discussing the historical
evolution of legal codification).
192. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908).
193. Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, Address at Harvard University (June 28,
1905), available at http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches
/143.txt (emphasis added). In addition to his comments on the legal profession,
President Roosevelt also championed the cause of scholarship in this address. See id.
(“The ideal for the graduate school and for those undergraduates who are to go into it
must be the ideal of high scholarly production, which is to be distinguished in the
sharpest fashion from the mere transmittal of ready-made knowledge without adding
to it. If America is to contribute its full share to the progress not alone of knowledge,
but of wisdom, then we must put ever-increasing emphasis on university work done
along the lines of the graduate school.”).
194. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS.
195. See id. Preamble (“The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends
upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit
the approval of all just men.”); see also Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 45
(“The term ‘canon’ derives initially from biblical studies, where ‘the canon’ referred
to those sacred texts officially included in the Bible (the antonym was ‘apocrypha’).”).
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existed a formal ethical code for attorneys in the United States.196 Despite the
fact that the specific rule on conflicts of interest was rather terse,197 it did
provide the beginnings for the further development of first-order ethical rules
in the form of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.198
a. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the ABA enacted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which constituted a significant revision – indeed, perhaps one can even
say a redrafting – of the first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United
States.199 Notably, the Model Code reorganized the rules in question into a
three-fold structure: canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules.200
The canons continued to provide general direction to attorneys,201 while the
ethical considerations provided aspirational rules.202 Further, the disciplinary
rules203 provided the first step in what Professor Hazard calls the “legalization” process of the norms of professional conduct.204 Accordingly, while the
Model Code may be viewed as an intermediate step between the 1908 Canons
and the Model Rules, on closer inspection the Model Code provided a clear
break from the past in that first-order rules for attorneys now took the form, at
least in part, of what is now frequently known as professional regulation.205
Nevertheless, the Model Code did maintain some elements of the 1908
Canons through the vehicle of the canons and, more specifically, the ethical

196. See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS.
197. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (“It is unprofessional to represent

conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.”).
198. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canons 5, 9 (1981).
199. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement.
200. See id.
201. See id. (“The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.”).
202. See id. (“The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.”).
203. See id. (“The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.”).
204. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1251 (“In retrospect, it is clear that the crucial step in the ‘legalization’ process occurred in the
change from the 1908 Canons to the 1970 code, rather than from the Code to the 1983
Rules.”).
205. See id. (“The Code’s Disciplinary Rules formed the baseline of the 1983
Rules; indeed, many of the DR’s were carried over intact into the Rules.”).
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considerations.206 And the reasons for this division between the aspirational
and the mandatory, as Professor David Luban explains in his important work
on the subject matter,207 was in part due to the scholarship of Professor Lon
Fuller.208 In this sense, therefore, the ethical considerations provide a means
by which one may explore the “inner morality” of a profession that an otherwise mandatory rule may not achieve.209 Accordingly, the Model Code presents us with this bifurcated approach to first-order ethical rules – those that
are aspirational, and those that are mandatory.210
Of particular note for the present discussion on conflicts of interest, the
Model Code provides, under the rubric of an Ethical Consideration, a rule on
the appearance of impropriety, which may be helpful to consider at length:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor
of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the
courts and the judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional
Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession, one
dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers
in supporting the organized bar through the devoting of his time,
efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on
the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust
206. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement.
207. See David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL

ETHICS 801 (1998).
208. See id. at 806-07 (“Fuller was not only an important philosopher of legal
ethics, he was also, for a period of time, quite an influential one . . . . [T]he Model
Code divided its rules into aspirational ‘Ethical Considerations’ and mandatory ‘Disciplinary Rules.’ This structure was partly inspired by Fuller’s distinction between
the moralities of aspiration and duty in The Morality of Law.”). As Professor Owen
Fiss further observes, Fuller’s theoretical approach to law has its foundation in the
law of contract. Owen M. Fiss, Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
44 (1979); see also Luban, supra note 207, at 805 (“As Owen Fiss perceptively notes,
Fuller was a contracts scholar who was not only more interested in private law than in
public law, but who regarded private law as the template to which public law should
mold itself.”). Fuller’s contributions to contract law scholarship remain considerable.
See, e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) [hereinafter Fuller, Consideration and Form].
209. See Luban, supra note 207, at 807 (“One knows a priori, so to speak, how a
Fullerian analysis of legal ethics should run. There should be an outer morality concerned with the content of legal representations, and perhaps with issues such as a
lawyer’s honesty. But the interesting part of the analysis would be an effort to discover an inner morality of the legal profession, that is, a morality that makes law
practice possible. The inner morality, professional ethics in the proper sense of the
term, would consist of functional virtues and duties.” (emphasis added)).
210. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement.
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of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.211
The Model Code, therefore, provides first-order ethical rules that came
in an almost binary fashion – what one must do under the Disciplinary Rules,
and what one should do under the Ethical Considerations.212 In this manner,
conflicts of interest under the Model Code should be considered under both
the mandatory rule, as to whether a conflict of interest in point of fact exists
as enunciated in the Disciplinary Rules,213 as well as the possibility of an
appearance of impropriety in the given case.214 This approach evolved, however, under the present formulation of first-order ethical rules for the legal
profession – that is, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.215
b. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which remain the primary
source of first-order ethical rules for attorneys in the United States.216 In their
formulation, the Model Rules had the intended purpose of “legalizing” the
rules of legal ethics.217 In this sense, therefore, the Model Rules completed
the task that the Model Code initiated – that is, a concerted effort to remove
the rules of legal ethics from the vestiges of canonical prose, or the language
of professional scripture.218 Such a development, while not inevitable,219 was

MODEL CODE EC 9-6 (emphasis added).
See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement.
See MODEL CODE DR 5-102 to 5-107.
See MODEL CODE EC 9-6; infra Part III.A.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities, Scope (2012).
216. See MODEL RULES Preface.
217. See Hazard, The Future of Ethics, supra note 28, at 1241 (“[O]ver the last
twenty-five years or so the traditional norms have undergone important changes. One
important development is that those norms have become ‘legalized.’ The rules of
ethics have ceased to be internal to the profession; they have instead become a code of
public law enforced by formal adjudicative disciplinary process.”).
218. See id. at 1250-51.
219. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46 (“Geoffrey Hazard’s views of
the transformation are particularly significant, because, as the Kutak Commission’s
reporter who drafted the Model Rules, he occupies the dual role of chronicler and
prime mover of the final stage of the transition.”). Further, Daniel Reynolds served as
Assistant Reporter to the Kutak Commission, and I especially thank Professor Reynolds for his thoughtful comments on the arguments presented herein. See infra note
234.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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nevertheless an improvement in the self-regulation of the legal profession.220
In lieu of what may be considered as rather vague notions of “ethics” and
“professionalism” that arguably obtained under the Model Code and certainly
were set forth in the 1908 Canons, the Model Rules brought clarity and focus
to the regulation of attorneys as a profession.221 The clarity brought by the
Model Rules meant that vague notions of “ethics” and “professionalism”
were no longer the criteria upon which one would determine whether particular conduct by an attorney was permissible or not.222
As an example of the increased clarity, consider the manner in which the
Model Rules addressed the issue of an “appearance of impropriety” in comparison to the approach taken under the Model Code, as discussed previously.223 In keeping with the aim of legalizing the rules of legal ethics, the
Model Rules take the direct approach in that they discard the ethical consideration of an appearance of impropriety from the conflict of interest rules.224
The reasons for such an approach are persuasively explained in the commentary to the Model Rules:
The other rubric formerly used for dealing with disqualification is
the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a twofold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to
include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective
judgment by the former client. Second, since “impropriety” is undefined, the term “appearance of impropriety” is question-begging.
It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved either by simply analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance
of impropriety.225
Accordingly, the “appearance of impropriety” criterion is subject to
compelling criticism in that it makes the test a subjective one where the opinion of a former client will, more often than not, be decisive.226 Moreover, if
the effort behind the Model Rules is to legalize legal ethics, then the appear220. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1249 (“What were
fraternal norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been
transformed into a body of judicially enforced regulations.”).
221. See id.
222. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47.
223. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (1981); supra Part
II.D.1.a.
224. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.13 (2012).
225. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 5 (1995).
226. See id.
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ance of impropriety test could not remain in the manner set forth in the Model
Code.227 The criterion necessarily needed revision in order to move the test
from a subjective to an objective one.228 As a consequence, the Model Rules
in a certain sense reified the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code.229 This
change, then, is the current state of affairs of the first-order ethical rules for
the legal profession.230

2. Second-Order Ethical Rules
In contrast to first-order ethical rules, for purposes of this discussion a
second-order ethical rule is defined as a rule of ethics as may be prescribed by
the competent authority.231 In this sense, the distinction between first-order
and second-order ethical rules is primarily one of the rule-giver.232 In the
case of first-order ethical rules, the relevant profession provides the ethical
rules as a matter of self-regulation.233 As for second-order ethical rules, a
227. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47. To be sure, the assessment
on such points will necessarily change when considering the important issues that
concern conflict of interest scenarios for judges. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011) (“A judge shall uphold and promote the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 322 (1969)
(“The public is rightfully concerned with the interests of legislators, of lawyers, of
businessmen and the basis on which their decisions are made. The public rightfully is
interested in the appearance of impropriety on the part of its judges, and the public’s
judges should conform to the standards set forth many years ago by the thoughtful
members of the legal profession and codified in the Canons of Judicial Ethics.”).
228. This struggle between subjective and objective criteria under law is not without precedent. Indeed, such a debate was the essential question in respect of the modern law of contractual formation. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115
(4th ed. 2004) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become ascendant and courts universally accept it today.”).
229. See Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 28, at 1254; Luban &
Millemann, supra note 28, at 46-47.
230. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 14 (2012) (“The Rules of
Professional conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to
the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.”).
231. With respect to an additional definition as to what may constitute a competent authority, I adopt such language in an effort to provide neutral language in furtherance of additional discussion. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
232. This additional quantifier of the rule-giver that is not the relevant profession
is what transforms the first-order ethical rule into a second-order ethical rule. See
Enderton, supra note 181. This is to say, for instance, that an attorney will always be
subject to first-order ethical rules in connection with their licensure requirements with
the relevant bar association. However, such an attorney may or may not be subject to
certain second-order ethical rules, depending on the areas in which she may or may
not practice law.
233. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 10.
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competent authority in some sense imposes rules of legal ethics onto the profession.234 The difference, therefore, is largely one of governance.235 With
respect to first-order ethical rules, the professions, to some extent, decide
what ethical rules will bind them.236 First-order ethical rules, therefore, can
be seen as an effort by the professions to tie themselves to the mast, in a
manner of speaking, when approaching the Sirens.237 On the other hand,
second-order ethical rules are, by their very nature, imposed on the professions.238 And while the professions may or may not consent to such an imposition of ethical rules, the critical distinction is that while such consent may
be desired, it is by no means necessary.

234. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7 (2012). As a matter of legal history,
however, it is important to note that the interplay between the relevant profession and
a competent authority is often much more complex. For instance, much of the content
of the Attorney Conduct Rules was previously offered by the SEC prior to the adoption of the Model Rules. See Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed
Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 581 (1988) (“The [SEC], for example, solicited comments a number of years ago with respect to a rulemaking proposal initiated
by the Georgetown Institute for Public Representation. The proposal would have
required annual certification by corporations of a certain size to the effect: (1) that its
board of directors had instructed each lawyer employed or retained by the corporation
to report any probable law violations of a certain qualitative or quantitative seriousness; (2) that the attorneys had done so; and (3) that the board had taken appropriate
action with respect to the lawyer reports. The response of the organized corporate bar
was ferocious and directly attacked the SEC’s authority for such rulemaking, as well
as certain specifics of the proposal itself. These attacks, however, did not question the
fundamental legal correctness of the proposal’s view of the lawyer-management role.
In fact, however inadequately put, the proposal seems to have gotten it basically right.
This was in 1979. Soon thereafter, the Kutak Commission’s original version of Rule
1.13 appeared.” (emphasis added)). In this sense, therefore, much of what was right
in 1979 did not come to fruition until 2002 with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and
associated promulgation of the Attorney Conduct Rules.
235. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008) (“Corporate governance is a broad descriptive term
rather than a normative term. Corporate governance describes all of the devices,
institutions, and mechanisms by which corporations are governed.”).
236. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 12 (“The
legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of selfgovernment. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the bar.”).
237. See Roosevelt, supra note 193 (“It shall not help us if we avoid the Scylla of
baseness of motive, only to be wrecked on the Charybdis of wrong-headedness, of
feebleness and inefficiency.”).
238. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7.
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The occurrence of second-order ethical rules for the professions has particular salience for the corporate attorney.239 Indeed, it is in the case of the
corporate attorney that we find in sharp relief the distinction between firstorder ethical rules and second-order rules.240 Accordingly, in considering the
manner in which corporate attorneys concern themselves with second-order
ethical rules, one may further explore the precise manner in which such rules
may operate.241 The most notable example of second-order ethical rules for
the corporate attorney remains, by general consensus, the Attorney Conduct
Rules as enacted pursuant to the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley.242
a. Attorney Conduct Rules
Although the Attorney Conduct Rules are a matter deserving of extended discussion, for purposes of this categorization an overview of the notable provisions of such rules will be sufficient.243 Adopted by the SEC in
2003 pursuant to section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley,244 the Attorney Conduct
Rules have the stated purpose of “set[ting] forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the SEC in
the representation of an issuer.”245 A key limitation, therefore, in the scope of
the Attorney Conduct Rules is whether the attorney in question is
239. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate
Lawyer, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 204 (2000) [hereinafter Regan, Professional
Responsibility] (“Corporate lawyers also tend to be in the vanguard of another emerging trend in legal practice: the subjection of lawyers to multiple sources of ethical
governance.”).
240. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND
CORPORATE PRACTICE 729-30 (2005).
241. See id. at v (“The behavior of corporations and the professionals who advise
them are now the object of a searching scrutiny. Why, critics ask, didn’t the lawyers
stop the looting, the fraud, and the manipulations of loopholes?”); Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 69, at 1405.
242. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.7. See generally Simon M. Lorne, An IssueAnnotated Version of the Sox Rules for Lawyer Conduct (2005), reprinted in REGAN
& BAUMAN, supra note 240, at 712, 712-31.
243. For a more detailed discussion of the Attorney Conduct Rules, including the
discussions that took place in connection with the passage of Section 307 of SarbanesOxley and the regulations promulgated thereunder, see COFFEE, supra note 14, at 21623; HAZEN, supra note 49, § 9.8; Koniak, supra note 99, at 1269-78.
244. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66).
245. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (“These standards supplement applicable standards of any
jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit the
ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or other United
States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part,
this shall govern.”).
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“[a]ppearing and practicing before the [SEC].”246 Further, the Attorney Conduct Rules read in a manner similar to the Disciplinary Rules under the
Model Code,247 or the various rules provided in the Model Rules.248 In other
words, the Attorney Conduct Rules are not drafted in a strictly aspirational
sense as seen in the case of the 1908 Canons249 and the ethical considerations
set forth in the Model Code.250 Rather, the Attorney Conduct Rules are more
closely related to the Model Rules in that they seek to provide minimum
standards of professional conduct that will apply in the case of an attorney
that is appearing and practicing before the SEC.251
In particular, the Attorney Conduct Rules set forth the now famous “up
the ladder” reporting requirements for covered attorneys that become aware
of “evidence of a material violation”252 by their corporate client.253 Importantly, the Attorney Conduct Rules provide that the duty to report evidence of
a material violation is mandatory and thus is not a matter of personal discretion.254 Further, this reporting duty remains mandatory in instances in which
the attorney in question “reasonably believes”255 that the chief legal officer or
chief executive officer has not provided an “appropriate response”256 to such
246. Id. § 205.2(a). Notably, this defined term of “appearing and practicing before the [SEC]” does not include a “non-appearing foreign attorney.” Id. §
205.2(a)(2)(ii). In turn, the phrase “non-appearing foreign attorney” has its own defined term. Id. § 205.2(j).
247. Compare id. § 205.3(b), with MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5101 (1981).
248. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.7 (2012).
249. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon
6 (1908).
250. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), with MODEL CODE EC 5-1.
251. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1; MODEL RULES Scope ¶ 14.
252. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (“Evidence of a material violation means credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”). Further, the term
“material violation” has its own definition. Id. § 205.2(i) (“Material violation means
a material violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a
material breach of fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law.”).
253. More specifically, the Attorney Conduct Rules employ the term “issuer” as
further defined under federal securities laws. See id. § 205.2(h).
254. Id. § 205.3(b).
255. See id. § 205.2(m) (“Reasonably believes means that an attorney believes the
matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable.”); see also id. § 205.2(l) (“Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to the
actions of an attorney, conduct that would not be unreasonable for a prudent and
competent attorney.”).
256. See id. § 205.2(b) (providing an enumerated definition of what constitutes an
“appropriate response”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

41

File: HinesPaginated.docx

Created on: 10/21/13 9:21 PM
Missouri Law Review,
Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3 Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM

118

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

evidence of material violation. In such cases, therefore, the attorney must
report such evidence of material violation to the board of directors, the audit
committee, or another uninterested committee of the board of directors in
order to satisfy her duties under the Attorney Conduct Rules.257 Alternatively, the attorney may be subject to a separate reporting procedure in cases
where there is a “qualified legal compliance committee.”258 In either case,
however, the Attorney Conduct Rules provide mandatory rules of professional conduct that operate in the fashion of second-order ethical rules.259
Of note, the Attorney Conduct Rules specifically provide that they do
not create a private right of action.260 Nevertheless, the Attorney Conduct
Rules do provide that a violation thereof will subject an attorney to civil penalties and remedies that apply in the case of a violation of federal securities
laws.261 As one might imagine, therefore, attorneys appearing and practicing
before the SEC must carefully consider their responsibilities under both firstorder and second-order ethical rules.262 Such considerations are without the
scope of this Article.263 For the purposes of the present categorization, however, the nature and extent of ethical rules becomes clear – in both their firstorder and second-order formulations.

III. THE PRIMACY OF ETHICAL RULES OF THE CORPORATE
GATEKEEPER
With the foregoing categorization of conflicts of interest rules now
complete, the discussion may now turn to the argument in favor of the primacy of ethical rules for the corporate gatekeeper.264 This argument will be
Id. § 205.3(b)(3).
Id. § 205.3(c).
See id. § 205.3(b)-(c).
Id. § 205.7(a). Additionally, the final rules promulgated by the SEC did not
include the controversial “noisy withdrawal” provisions that were included in the
proposed rule. See Koniak, supra note 99, at 1274-78.
261. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
262. Compare id. § 205.3(b), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13
(2012).
263. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13, in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 20112012 ed.) (“In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates modified Model Rule 1.13
to respond to the claims that the old rule did not permit lawyers to prevent corporate
fraud which had a significant impact on their client’s financial wellbeing.”); Arnold
Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 68-70 (2003) (discussing the Kutak Commission’s recommendation with respect to Model Rule 1.13).
264. As noted previously, the intended scope of this argument in favor of the
primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper is in its potential application in
the areas of corporate and securities law. In this sense, therefore, ethical rules of the
257.
258.
259.
260.
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made in two-parts: (a) by comparing the previously defined categories of
conflicts rules,265 and (b) by arguing for an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper.266

A. Ethical Rules and the Corporate Gatekeeper
Reputation has long been an important factor in approaches to law.267
Indeed, the inclusion of reputation in the form of reputational capital in legal
theory has a long history within the law and economics schools of thought,268
which inform to a considerable degree the important work in the area of gatekeeper scholarship.269 Further, the application of reputation as a more specific criterion upon which to assess law has been explored in such varied ar-

corporate gatekeeper can be viewed as standing at the intersection of corporate law
and legal ethics. See supra note 13.
265. See infra Part III.A.1.
266. See infra Part III.A.2.
267. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 395-96 (1985) (“Reputation effects
will deter defection from the letter and the spirit of an agreement in the degree to
which (1) defections can be made public knowledge, (2) the consequences of defection can be fully ascertained (which will permit, among other things, real versus contrived claims of defection to be distinguished), and (3) parties who experience or
observe defection penalize the offender and/or his successors in ‘full measure.’”).
268. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 80, at 287 (“The theory is that the law firm protects clients against the lawyer-client agency problem by posting a bond in the form
of its reputation for client service and then monitoring the conduct of its member
lawyers to prevent forfeiture of the reputational bond.”); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 615, 616 (1981); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law
Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1998) (“By posting reputational ‘bonds,’
large law firms help ensure that their lawyers serve client interests, including in ways
that are not addressed by ethical rules. The reputational bond is not only critical to an
understanding of the large law firm’s role in reducing agency costs, but it also helps
explain some otherwise puzzling aspects of law firm organization.”); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 529, 532 n.29 (1983).
269. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 2-3; Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 915 (1990)
(“Here, then, is my best (and only) candidate for the next generation of private gatekeeper: the inside lawyer.”); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply
to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2004) (“The central theoretical point is
that reputational arguments related to gatekeepers are complex and reputation alone is
not necessarily a viable constraint on gatekeeper certification.”); Andrew F. Tuch,
Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1614 (2010) (“All this suggests that reputations may not be well-calibrated to the quality of gatekeeper performance in past
transactions and are thus noisy, or crude, indicators of gatekeeper performance.”).
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eas of law such as international law,270 corporate law271 and international
financial law.272
While invoking the usage of the term “reputation” no doubt strongly
suggests that important issues of law and policy are raised, the initial question
that must be asked is – what is reputation?273 As a matter of etymology, the
word “reputation” derives from the Latin reputatio, which means “the action
of thinking about, consideration; a subject of thought, reflection.”274 Accordingly, the word reputation may properly be considered as a term that connotes
some manner of introspection.275 Contrasted with the modern usage of the
word reputation, which is more typically associated with one’s regard within
a community,276 this ancient and perhaps more precise definition of reputation has resonance in the ethical context. For, in the words of Warren Buffett,
if you think about your reputation as something that takes twenty years to
build and five minutes to ruin, you will do things differently.277 With this
definition of reputation in mind, we may now turn to the comparison of the
categories of conflicts as has been set forth in the preceding pages of this
Article.278
270. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law 15 (UC
Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1112064, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112064 (“The reputation of a
state is contingent on its past behavior but it is the knowledge that today’s conduct
will affect tomorrow’s reputation that gives reputational sanctions their force.”).
271. Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15,
46 (1995) (“What can be said with certainty is that the reputation model provides a
powerful lens for examining the practice of corporate law.”).
272. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 286 (2011) (“As a result, noncompliance with key international standards, if discovered, will cause other countries to rethink or reevaluate
their expectations concerning the regulator’s future behavior (or ‘reputation’).”).
273. See supra notes 153, 157.
274. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1624 (1982).
275. See id. One may also consider the additional meaning of reputatio as being
“a consideration to be taken into account when drawing up a financial statement.”
Id.; see infra Part III.A.2.
276. See Reputation Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www
.oed.com/view/Entry/163228 (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (defining reputation as “the
condition, quality, or fact of being highly regarded or esteemed; credit, fame, distinction; respectability, good report.”).
277. See Editorial, supra note 2; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 36, at 1003
(“The rules of legal ethics do in fact impose such an additional level of sanctions, as
the attorney found to have engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest is subject
to serious penalties, including loss of reputation, license suspension, or even disbarment – sanctions sufficient to make attorneys think twice about engaging in inappropriate conflicts of interest or disclosing client secrets or confidences to third parties.”).
278. See supra Parts II.A-D.
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1. Comparison of the Categories of Conflicts Rules
As a means of further developing the notion of the primacy of ethical
rules of the corporate gatekeeper, it will be helpful to consider the manner in
which the previously defined categories of conflicts rules interrelate.279 More
specifically, a comparison of the categories of conflicts rules in respect of the
positive and negative interests at issue for each of the professional qua gatekeeper and the corporate client itself will be instructive.280 For when considering conflicts rules, the tension often lies with the respective responsibilities
assumed by the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client.281 One
might imagine an instance where the corporate client may wish to engage in
certain illegal and perhaps even immoral conduct,282 but the professional qua
gatekeeper must intervene as a matter of professional ethics.283 Cases of conflict of interest, therefore, are necessarily – in a phrase – conflicted. And they
are conflicted precisely in the sense that the interest of one party is set against
the interest of another party.284
Much of this makes intuitive sense, and indeed is reflected in the applicable first-order ethical rules.285 But what does this import when comparing
the various species of conflicts rules? Are some conflicts rules more properly
designed to address certain issues in law and policy than others? And if so,
what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each of these species of conflicts rules? In attempting to answer such questions, the rule maker
will need to consider, at least to some degree, the precise manner of rule that
will be employed.286 The rule maker, in this sense, must know what rules she
279. See supra Parts II.A-D.
280. The comparative approach remains an important method of inquiry in law

and other disciplines. See generally Roscoe Pound, What May We Expect From
Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A. J. 56, 59 (1936).
281. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, such tension is aptly captured with the language of adversity between the attorney and her client. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2012).
282. In making such an observation, we need not address the possible connection
of law with morals. See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 629 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630-31 (1958). Suffice it to note that cases involving conflicts of interest will often raise questions that
will implicate both law and morality, regardless of their connection with one another.
283. See MODEL RULES R. 1.13 (stating the up the ladder reporting requirement
for attorneys of corporate clients); 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2012) (referencing a duty to
report evidence of an issuer-client’s material violations).
284. See MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a)(1).
285. See id. R. 1.7-1.13.
286. This said, the reality may well be that the rule maker has other more pressing
considerations in mind, such as the need of a reelection. Nevertheless, the point to be
made is that if the law is to have any coherence, then some notion of the rule of law
must obtain. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-41 (revised
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is writing.287 And if this is indeed the case, then a categorization of conflicts
rules will provide some structure through which the decision as to the particular rule that will be employed can be made.288 Here, therefore, is the intended
purpose of the aforementioned categorization of conflicts rules.
But prior to a specific consideration of each of the aforementioned categories, it may be helpful to first compare the positive and negative interests of
each of the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client. For the
purpose of such a comparison, I will adopt a broad notion of “interest” for
each of the parties in question.289 Thus, for the professional qua gatekeeper,
the positive interest will be defined as matters that fall within the self-interest
of such gatekeeper as a member of her chosen profession.290 The negative
interest for such gatekeeper, therefore, will be the logical opposite – matters
that fall without the self-interest of such gatekeeper as a member of her chosen profession.291 Further to such descriptions, the positive interest of the
corporate client will be defined as matters that fall within the self-interest of
the corporate enterprise, broadly considered. In turn, the negative interest of
the corporate client will also be the logical opposite – that is to say, those
matters that fall without the self-interest of the corporate enterprise, again in
the broadest sense.292
Here, the effort remains to provide both the reader and the author with a
common language with which to engage in discussion.293 And while there
may be other terms that would be seen as more attractive to the particular
ed. 1969) [hereinafter . FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW]; HART, supra note 180, at
80-81.
287. See generally David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 636, 650-54 (1983) (exploring the development of moral epistemology); Matthias Steup, Epistemology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (DEC. 14, 2005),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/.
288. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 31, at 3-24.
289. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.7-1.13.
290. In this sense, the definition of the “positive interest” of the gatekeeper may
be read to include the Brandeisian notion of the attorney acting in the public interest.
See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION
313, 321 (1914). However, such a reading cannot be read to the point that the gatekeeper disappears as an entity that is separate and distinct from the public. Accordingly, the positive interest as defined herein can be viewed in the Brandeisian sense of
being the public interest as may be expressed by the professional qua gatekeeper.
291. To be sure, there are an infinite number of cases where the positive interest
and negative interest may blend into one another. As a means, however, of developing the argument presented this distinction becomes necessary. Accordingly, the
distinction between the positive interest and negative interest can be viewed as applying in the marginal sense.
292. See supra notes 290-91.
293. See BISHIN & STONE, supra note 158, at vii (noting that the study of law is an
“effort of the human mind to make ‘reality’ comprehendable and manageable”
through language and philosophy).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/3

46

File: HinesPaginated.docx

2013]

Created on: 10/21/13 9:21 PM
Hines: Hines:
Corporate Gatekeeper

THE CORPORATE GATEKEEPER

Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:10 PM

123

reader, I ask that such reader take this proffered terminology in light of its
intended purpose.294 I will note, however, that in using the term “self interest” I do not mean to imply that such interests be considered in the narrow
sense. By this definition I mean that when invoking such language I am not
making a particular claim for a normative ethical position.295 Rather, I seek
to use the term “self interest” in a more specific sense – that is, the specific
sense to the professional as a member of her chosen profession.296 Accordingly, the self-interest in question is not solely a personal one. Indeed, when
considered as such, the self-interest in question is the interest of the profession itself as may be channeled through the particular professional under consideration.297 This definition is a preferred approach to consider interests of
the profession because this approach is how – one must imagine – professional ethics actually works.298 This is to say, while the first-order and second-order ethical rules provide guidance, in the final analysis the ethical decision remains an individual one.299 Thus, the ethical choice for the professional qua gatekeeper is to consider her ethical duties and responsibilities as a
member of her chosen profession.
When considering the positive and negative interests of each of the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client as such, the following description emerges:

294. See supra note 27.
295. See WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 15 (2d ed. 1973) (“Ethical egoism holds

that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good – that an act or rule
of action is right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over evil
for him in the long run as any alternative would, and wrong if it does not.”).
296. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 1 (2012) (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice.”).
297. Cf. Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at 802 (“One who
wishes to communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning
into defined and recognizable channels; he must reduce the fleeting entities of wordless thought to the patterns of conventional speech.”).
298. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 214 (“[T]he transformative character of corporate enterprise virtually guarantees that corporate lawyers
perpetually will be facing dilemmas for which our existing professional responsibility
framework provides imperfect guidance.”).
299. See id.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Positive and Negative Interests

In every case, therefore, there will be four possible outcomes.300 There
may be instances where the conflict rule in question can be seen as reading to
the negative interest of the gatekeeper and the negative interest of the corporation. This “double negative” circumstance is illustrated in the upper left
quadrant of the matrix.301 Alternatively, the conflict rule may remain in the
gatekeeper’s negative interest but may more properly be viewed as in the
corporation’s positive interest. Here, then, is the upper right quadrant.302
But, of course, the “mixed” interest circumstance can turn on its head,
whereby the conflict rule reads to the gatekeeper’s positive interest and the
corporation’s negative interest. This will be the lower left quadrant of the

300. But see supra note 291.
301. As a matter of optics, the “double negative” is written in shorthand as “Gate-

keeper Negative / Corporation Negative.”
302. This “mixed” interest circumstance is noted as “Gatekeeper Negative / Corporation Positive.”
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matrix.303 And, finally, there will be those instances where the conflict rule in
question reads to the positive interest of both the gatekeeper and the corporation. This is the lower right quadrant.304
But this may all be seen as somewhat of an abstraction.305 Indeed, the
close reader may say, although this structure is consistent in and of itself, it is
merely that – a structure without substance. I will concede that, at least in its
initial outlines, such criticism has some merit. Nevertheless, it is in bringing
substance to such a form that we may more intensely consider the theoretical
foundations of conflicts rules.306 And when applying the aforementioned
categorization to such a substance, the following illustration comes into view:
Figure 2: Comparison of Categorized Conflicts Rules

303. Accordingly, this “mixed” circumstance carries the label “Gatekeeper Positive / Corporation Negative.”
304. This final quadrant is described as “Gatekeeper Positive / Corporation Positive.”
305. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986) (“[W]e might understand
law better if we could find a similar abstract description of the point of law most legal
theorists accept so that their arguments take place on the plateau it furnishes . . . .
[J]urisprudence [does not] depend on finding an abstract description of that sort.”).
306. See Hines, supra note 1, at 42 n.46 (noting the importance of examining a
theory in order to understand its problem-solving capabilities).
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Activity rules occupy the upper left quadrant because they are, by definition, rules of limitation.307 Thus, the corporation cannot receive certain
consulting services from its auditor, even though the auditor might provide
the most desirable consulting services on such matters in the market.308 Such
a rule will benefit neither party – the auditor will lose the business of such
consulting services, and the corporation will not receive the services it seeks
from its auditor.309 In turn, liability rules rests in the upper right quadrant in
that the corporation would prefer to place the blame on the gatekeeper by
pointing the finger.310 Understandably, the gatekeeper would rather not have
this finger pointed in her direction, and will therefore view such liability rules
from a negative perspective. Disclosure rules sit in the lower left quadrant for
similar reasons. The gatekeeper would likely prefer the corporation to clear
the air by going public with, for instance, a press release that would correct
any continuing fraud that may exist within the market.311 In contrast, the
corporation will understandably be reluctant to make such disclosure because
it will bring to light an otherwise hidden wrong.
But what then of the lower right hand quadrant? Here, I argue, is where
ethical rules lie. For it is in the clear interest of the gatekeeper to maintain
her status within the market as a professional, and in so doing she must uphold the stated ethical requirements of her chosen profession.312 Further, the
corporation seeks the services of the gatekeeper precisely because she is a
professional – she provides a specialized service that the corporation cannot
obtain solely on its own.313 Ethical rules are, in this sense, a necessity for
both the gatekeeper and the corporation.314 As a consequence, ethical rules
occupy a primary position within the constellation of conflicts rules.315 This
is not to say, of course, that activity rules, liability rules, and disclosure rules
have no relevance when assessing conflicts of interest rules within the ambit
of corporate and securities law.316 Quite the contrary – the rule maker, when
307. See supra Part II.A.
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)(1)-(9) (2006).
309. See generally COFFEE, supra note 14, at 146-52 (examining changes within

the auditing profession that increase conflicts with clients).
310. See supra Part II.B; supra note 81 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part II.C; see generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
312. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 19 (2012).
313. See Gilson, supra note 269, at 889.
314. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 214 (“Directives
must have an aspirational, rather than merely descriptive, character. This unavoidably
requires reflection upon the roles we believe lawyers should play and the normative
commitments they should seek to realize.”).
315. See supra note 27.
316. See supra note 27.
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considering possible alternatives in federal securities law, must consider such
rules.317 But it must first begin with the ethical rules. For without the ethical
rules, the entire structure of gatekeeper enforcement in the various professions will collapse like so many houses of cards.318 The primacy of ethical
rules, therefore, obtains in the context of corporate and securities law where
the gatekeeper is an actor.319

2. The Corporate Gatekeeper in Ethical Perspective
If we may then agree that ethical rules occupy a primary position within
the various categories of conflicts rules, what ethical rule should be under
consideration in the present state of affairs in corporate and securities law?320
Here, I argue that an ethical perspective within the context of corporate and
securities law is necessary.321 More specifically, by providing additional
legal rules that will build upon the notion of an ethical perspective as to the
corporate gatekeeper, the landscape within corporate and securities law will,
hopefully, improve for the better.322 And in facilitating the process by which
the gatekeeper thinks, considers, and reflects upon her actions, the intention is
that better decisions will ultimately be made.
Although one can imagine a host of potential changes in law that will
build upon this notion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate gatekeeper, at the present time perhaps further analysis of forthcoming proxy
disclosures may provide additional information of interest.323 Here, I have in
317. See supra note 27.
318. See generally SORKIN, supra note 6.
319. Further to this notion of the primacy of ethical rules, the potential benefits of

such an approach can be more specifically enunciated within the context of federal
securities law enforcement. For instance, imagine that in the given case that the gatekeeper or her client engages in certain conduct that arguably may be in violation of an
ethical rule, in either its first-order or second-order formulations. In such a case, the
violation of such an ethical rule could have probative value in assessing whether the
gatekeeper or her client engaged in conduct sufficient to satisfy the state of mind
requirement in Section 10(b) actions. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (holding that allegations of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud are required for a private right of action in a Section 10(b) action). Accordingly, the violation of an ethical rule can provide additional information and context to the determination of a possible violation of a liability rule. In this sense, an incentive-based
approach to ethical rules – and in particular the assessment of penalties for the violation thereof – can be seen as the interplay between ethical rules and liability rules.
See generally POSNER, supra note 44, § 12.4.
320. See Regan, Professional Responsibility, supra note 239, at 204.
321. See generally Koniak, supra note 99, at 1278-80.
322. See generally id.
323. More specifically, such analysis would be of disclosure rules in the first
instance, as such category has been defined for purposes of this article. See supra
Part II.C.
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mind the final rule on Compensation Committee independence standards as
part of the Dodd-Frank reforms.324 If the effort is to facilitate an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper, then perhaps encouraging such an
approach by means of the disclosure rules may be a helpful way to start.325
Accordingly, in reviewing the forthcoming proxy disclosure as mandated by
the final rule, we may be able to achieve a better understanding as to how
such issues are addressed by market actors.326
On this point, one can imagine that careful consideration of conflicts already takes within the practice of law. For instance, imagine a partners’
meeting at a leading law firm in the United States.327 Assume, for the moment, that a potential engagement raises a conflict of interest. At some point,
the discussion may turn to the questions – do we really want to take on this
representation? Is this who we are? How will this affect our reputation?
And if such discussion already takes place within the practice of law,328
324. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
325. See BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 118, at 92 (“Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). But see
Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2005).
326. See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 952. In considering additional ethical rules
along such lines, the action – that is, the manifested behavior – of the professional qua
gatekeeper could be constructed in such fashion as to constitute a formality of sorts.
See Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at 805 (“Forms must be reserved
for relatively important transactions. We must preserve a proportion between means
and end; it will scarcely do to require a sealed and witnessed document for the effective sale of a loaf of bread.”). Although the focus of the discussion will likely then
turn to the nature and quality of the formality in question, the specifics of any such
formality will undoubtedly be subject to the political process. See POSNER, supra
note 44, § 19.3. Nevertheless, one senses that – as a matter of legal theory – the key
move in the extended discussion of doctrine will have been made. The question,
therefore, will become one of competing formalities. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201-66) (chief executive officer and chief financial officer certification of
financial statements of reporting companies).
327. See, e.g., RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 186, at 32-35.
328. Within the practice of law, this brief hypothetical will admittedly be much
more complex. For instance, one imagines that the respective ethical concerns for
actors within the law firm will be quite different. Senior Partner W with equity in the
firm will stand in a different position from Junior Partner X, who may have little or no
equity at all. Further, Senior Associate Y may have a different perspective than Junior Associate Z. However, one supposes that both will stand in a different position
from legal assistants and staff who are not subject to rules of professional ethics in
connection with state bar licensure requirements. Moreover, the respective risk to
reputation as opposed to opportunity of an optimum of professional performance –
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should not the applicable federal regulations further reflect the concerns that
are raised by ethical rules?329 The potential benefits of such revisions can be
seen as four-fold: (i) the relevant profession will more proactively address
matters of conflicts of interest through individual cases;330 (ii) the professional qua gatekeeper will be reminded of the importance of preserving her
reputational capital;331 (iii) a potential collective action problem will be addressed in that an ethical perspective as to the corporate gatekeeper will be
universally applied to the gatekeepers in question;332 and (iv) the normative
ends of justice, such as they are, may be more fully achieved by focusing the
attention of both the professional qua gatekeeper and her corporate client.333
In taking such steps to facilitate introspection by the professional qua
gatekeeper, we may then achieve some measure of consideration of ethical
rules in the difficult case.334 While it is far from clear that this will in fact
occur, at the least the law will have provided an additional method by which
that is to say, a “happy” client – will necessarily be different for attorneys within the
law firm, given their level of involvement in the relevant case or transaction. Thus,
an attorney with no part in an engagement that subsequently ruins the reputation of
the firm in five minutes will in this sense lose the reputation of the firm that she may
have helped build over twenty years. Here, recall the accounting fraud scandals –
Enron, Worldcom and the rest – as well as the most notable instances from the financial crisis – Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, etc. See Hines, supra note 1, at 34-38.
In the case of the large firm, therefore, this asymmetry of reputational effects will be
an important issue to consider as a matter of firm governance and, more broadly, by
the professions as a matter of their self-regulation. My thanks to Professor Hazard in
providing me with these insightful thoughts.
329. By definition, such an ethical rule would constitute a second-order ethical
rule. See supra Part II.D.2. Further, such a second-order ethical rule can be viewed
as the means by which ethical decision, such as it is, may be channeled by the professional qua gatekeeper. See, e.g., Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra note 208, at
802.
330. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIL MORALS 13
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., Greenwood Press 1983) (1950) (“A system of ethics,
however, is not to be improvised. It is the task of the very group to which they are to
apply.”); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 67 (1978)
(“[A]cting as lawyer for the situation can be thought of as similar to a doctor’s
‘authority’ to terminate the life of a hopeless patient: It can be properly undertaken
only if it will not be questioned afterwards.”).
331. See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Steven Kuhn, Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Oct. 22, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/. Here, the issue of
reputational asymmetry remains an important issue for consideration. See supra note
328.
333. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 36, at 1102-05.
334. In this sense, the law may then approach the Fullerian notion of an inner
morality in cases where the professional qua gatekeeper undertakes such a meditation
on her professional responsibilities. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note
286, at 41-44; Luban, supra note 207, at 807.
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such consideration may take place – from an ethical perspective.335 And the
specific manner in which such consideration takes place will be in the assessment by the professional qua gatekeeper of her reputation – that fleeting
thing that takes twenty years to build and five minutes to ruin.336

IV. CONCLUSION
The classification of conflicts of interest remains one of the enduring
challenges in both corporate law and legal ethics in that it raises fundamental
questions as to the proper role of the professional qua gatekeeper.337 And
while such a classification can never truly be complete,338 an attempt to consider the ethical implications of such conflicts does, in a certain sense, engage
with both the burdens and responsibilities of professional practice.339 As the
Model Rules note in their Preamble on a Lawyer’s Responsibilities:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities
are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.
These principles include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of
the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.340
The foregoing discussion of the primacy of ethical rules of the corporate
gatekeeper hopefully furthers the discussion on the professional, ethical, and
moral dilemmas that may be encountered by the professional in practice.341
Moreover, in this Article’s review of the recent changes to proxy disclosures

335. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981).
336. See Editorial, supra note 2.
337. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 365 (“In principle, the professions should be

uniquely sensitive to the dangers surrounding conflicts of interest. Still, the 1990s
revealed little, if any, evidence of self-restraint.”).
338. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 210.
339. See Fried, supra note 172, at 1061.
340. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶
9 (2012).
341. See Wasserstrom, supra note 166, at 1-2 n.1.
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rules342 – that is, ethical rules of the second-order – the corporate gatekeeper
may be reconsidered from the perspective of those rules prescribed by the
professions themselves – that is to say, ethical rules of the first-order.

342. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301-5641).
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